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ABSTRACT 
 
 
AILEEN VIRREY LAPITAN. Municipal agricultural service delivery in the Philippines: 
Three empirical essays. (Under the direction of DR. JOSEPH WHITMEYER) 
 
 
This dissertation examines three aspects of municipal agricultural service delivery 
in the Philippines. The first essay investigates the effect of rural constituency share, fiscal 
factors, and provincial government performance on the municipal government’s 
performance of agricultural service delivery. Random effects ordinal logit estimates 
suggest that for highly rural municipalities that are encumbered by resource and capacity 
limitations, agricultural support performance is contingent on the provincial 
government’s performance. The second essay estimates the influence of income, political 
factors and neighbor-effects on agricultural spending of municipal governments in the 
province of Bohol. Results of the random effects estimation reveal the significant 
influence of income and spill-over effects from neighboring municipalities. Using social 
network data for participating mayors in Bohol, the third essay investigates how relative 
attitudes toward a prospective agricultural policy are influenced by embeddedness within 
the community of mayors in the province. Exact logistic estimates show that a higher 
betweenness centrality improves the odds that a mayor shares his peers’ attitudes toward 
the economic benefits of organic farming promotion. The OLS estimations of policy 
attitude gaps reveal that a higher Bonacich centrality significantly increases the attitude 
disparities. Results suggest that convergence of policy attitudes necessitates the active 
engagement of “key actors” in policy-focused discourse. These essays depict an 
intriguing picture of devolved service delivery in which performance, policies and 
perceptions are influenced by interactions beyond local jurisdictional boundaries. 
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INTRODUCTION 
 
 
Despite modest improvement in the past ten years, poverty remains to be a rural 
phenomenon since about 70 percent of the developing world’s extremely poor population 
lives in the countryside (IFAD, 2010). The problem of poverty coupled with concerns 
about food security brings agriculture-led development to the forefront of developing 
countries’ priorities. Productivity-boosting innovations are a key part of agriculture-led 
development but small farmers rarely have access to such useful knowledge. The public 
sector in developing countries has therefore been providing agricultural research and 
extension to farmer-clients, taking the lead toward agricultural development.  
In most developing countries, public provision of agricultural support services is 
undertaken under a centralized government system. In its fullest extent, such a system has 
the national government exercising extensive authority in the formulation, adoption and 
implementation of policies.  It also retains control of the decision making. Following a 
policy choice, the central government determines the programs and activities that it will 
pursue to attain desired outcomes. It works through a bureaucracy extending to regional 
and field office levels, down to the local governments in what appears to be an 
administratively de-concentrated implementation structure. In such a centralized system, 
information asymmetry can undermine the capacity of policy decision makers at the 
national government level to fully gauge the applicability of policies and programs on the 
ground. They also cannot get assurance of holding local implementing agents accountable 
for their efforts. The national government therefore relies on hierarchical control and 
auditing mechanisms to ensure cooperative participation. Under the centralized system, 
ensuring efficient cooperation from the ground entails costly monitoring efforts from the 
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center. Such situation reflects what the literature on rural poverty reduction point out as 
implementation issues in a centralized approach to agricultural development (Farrington 
& Lomax, 2001; Ashley & Maxwell, 2001). These issues bear similarity with arguments 
about the failures of central planning in enacting policy put forth by “bottom-up” 
approach advocates in policy implementation research (Pressman & Wildawsky, 1973; 
Lipsky, 1980).  
The “bottom-up” approach to policy implementation contends that local agents 
have better information about the local environment and the specific needs of target 
beneficiaries than policy actors at the center who are involved in the formulation of the 
policies and programs. On this basis, Hjern, Hanf and Porter (1978) argue that the 
engagement of local service-delivery actors in the early stage of planning, financing, and 
execution of the policies can lead to successful realization of policy objectives. 
Engagement of local agents in the early stages of the policy process enables them to 
develop affinity with the central authority and thereby identify with the latter’s interest, 
which motivates them to exert best efforts toward the policy’s goals (Coleman, 1990). 
The phenomenon of administrative and political decentralization which has swept 
through many developing countries in the past few decades (Dillinger, 1995) provides a 
parallel concept to the “bottom-up” policy making approach. From the previous top-down 
practice of assigning local governments as implementation arms of the national 
government, the new environment of decentralized governance promotes greater local 
engagement in policymaking. Devolution of authority to local governments for provision 
and delivery of public goods brings governance closer to the citizens and with it, 
opportunities to adopt and effectively implement poverty-alleviating agricultural policies 
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and programs. Case studies from developing countries serve as evidence of how 
decentralization has served to improve representation of the poor and socially 
disadvantaged groups in society (Bardhan & Mookherjee, 2006).  
Decentralization of governance is defined as movement of authority, 
responsibility and resources from the central to local units of government (Rondinelli, 
1980). This definition embodies devolution, one of several interpretations of 
decentralization, and arguably the most used. Cheema and Rondinelli (2007) place 
devolution under the broader concept of political decentralization, which also includes 
support for citizen and civil society participation as well as power-sharing within the state 
in the pattern of federalism. In their survey of developments in the Asia Pacific region, de 
Guzman and Reforma (1993) identify three other concepts bureaucratic decentralization:  
1) assigning functions from the national government to regional and other lower tiers of 
the central office bureaucracies (de-concentration); 2) handing over of public services to 
the private sector (privatization); and 3) engagement of alternative channels like non-
government organizations and civil society groups. Cheema and Rondinelli (2007) 
classify de-concentration and delegation of authority to semiautonomous state agents 
under their concept of administrative decentralization, and set privatization with market 
liberalization, deregulation and public-private partnerships under market decentralization. 
These diverse interpretations of decentralization underline the importance of local 
governments, the private sector, civil society and bureaucratic units in the periphery in 
boosting political participation across groups in society as well as the multiplicity of 
channels through which public services could be delivered.  This dissertation 
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concentrates on the understanding of decentralization that is most useful to the analysis of 
the local governance of agricultural service delivery: devolution. 
Devolution is a step in the direction of local political autonomy because it points 
to the actual diminution of direct central control (Siedentopf, 1987). It gives local 
governments the authority to independently determine how devolved public services will 
be delivered in their jurisdictions.    It shrinks the breadth of geographical area coverage 
for public service delivery, enabling local officials to identify and prioritize area-specific 
needs. Devolution also shrinks the communication and political distance between 
providers and users of public goods thereby simplifying the attribution of performance 
and improving the degree of accountability to local constituents. The limited area over 
which local governments operate makes it convenient for constituents to express specific 
policy concerns. Moreover, devolution simplifies performance attribution by bringing to 
light area-specific failures and successes that could be overshadowed by aggregated 
national outcomes. Being able to directly attribute performance to the local government 
leadership also promotes political accountability and citizen participation. 
The Journey of the Philippines Toward Decentralization  
Of the countries that were part of the political decentralization trend in the 1990’s, 
the Philippines is noted as one of the most successful in decentralizing their agricultural 
extension systems (World Bank, 2000). The level of political autonomy enjoyed by local 
governments in the Philippines is a product of a long journey from its pre-colonial past 
toward democracy. Accounts of the history of local government in the Philippines point 
to a decentralized system as early as the pre-colonial era (De Guzman, Reforma & 
Panganiban, 1998). Autonomous village governments called “barangays” were already 
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established before the arrival of the colonizers from Spain. These village governments 
were led by a “datu” who exercised executive, legislative and judicial authority over his 
jurisdiction, with the assistance of a group of village elders as advisers. To ensure firm 
control over the islands, Spain installed a hierarchical colonial system of government 
composed of “barrios”—the equivalents of “barangays”—municipalities, cities and 
provinces. Over this system was the supreme authority of the Spanish colonial 
government based in Manila. Barrios were the basic units of government and their leaders 
were assigned the task of collecting taxes. Local government leaders were appointed and 
supervised by the colonial government in Manila, a practice that was slightly relaxed in 
the later years through the passing of the 1893 Maura Law. This law allowed the 
participation of local citizens in the choice of some of the local officers although control 
continued to be centralized.  
Toward the conclusion of the Spanish colonial era came a brief run of the first 
Philippine republic and the establishment of an American colonial government close on 
the heels of the Philippine Revolution and the Spanish-American War. This period was 
characterized by movements away from and then back again to centralized governance 
(Tapales, 1998). The revolutionary government adopted popular and direct local elections 
and applied a level of supervision that could ensure a balance of power between the 
national and local governments. Although such a design is not uncharacteristic of the 
American model, the American colonial government at that time found it convenient to 
maintain centralized control of government, primarily to contain military struggles in 
some areas and to deal with a perceived shortage of leadership capable of running the 
local governments. Centralized control of local governments continued well into the 
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country’s commonwealth years. During this period, the president had the authority to 
appoint mayors and to define the size, boundaries, names and seats of local governments 
(De Guzman, Reforma & Panganiban, 1998). 
Moves toward greater political decentralization resumed after the Second World 
War, although this process was interrupted by the declaration of Martial Law in 1972 
(Tapales, 1998). Post-war, central control of local governments eased and their autonomy 
in funds appropriation was promoted through legislation. The powers of cities and 
municipalities to tax were expanded through the Local Autonomy Act in 1959. Local 
governments were also authorized to assist in national agricultural extension and rural 
health programs and to act more independently of the national government in certain 
kinds of local action through the Decentralization Act of 1967. This same law increased 
internal revenue sharing and devolved some of the staff appointment responsibilities to 
the leadership of provincial governments. While these laws and others before them lay 
down a basis for decentralized governance, Tapales (1998) notes how the “centralist 
relationship” between the national and local governments had not been changed, owing 
perhaps to the varying governance styles of every incumbent president and the fact that 
local governments were directly under the authority of the executive branch.  
The relegation of local governments to the role of implementation arms of 
national government policies would later become more apparent as martial law created 
substantial changes in the structure of government in the country. Through eight years of 
martial law, the president reassumed much authority in determining the existence, 
boundaries and leadership in local governments. Local elections were suspended and the 
president exercised the authority to appoint officials to local government seats. While the 
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regime did not decentralize authority to local governments and allow them to determine 
their course of action, it did delegate the administration of government policies and 
programs to regional governments, ministries, development councils and integrated area 
development clusters (De Guzman, Reforma & Panganiban, 1998).  Central control of 
local governments was somewhat eased with the restoration of direct local elections for 
municipal, city and provincial officials just before the lifting of martial law in 1981, 
followed by the resumption of barangay elections soon after.  Along with the changes 
that followed these developments was the renewed emphasis by the central government 
on strengthening the administrative and fiscal capabilities of local governments through 
the creation of the Ministry of Local Government and promulgation of the 1983 Local 
Government Code (LGC), which laid down the structure, roles and functions of local 
government units (Tapales, 1998). The system remained essentially centralized, however, 
as a result of long years under martial law. 
Significant progress in decentralization could be observed after the 1986 
revolution. Reforms culminated in the passage of the 1991 Local Government Code 
(LGC), which devolved the delivery of basic services including health, social welfare, 
environment, public works, education, tourism, telecommunication and housing, and 
agriculture. Personnel and assets were also devolved to help the local governments fulfill 
these new roles. Along with devolution, the LGC encouraged greater participation among 
citizens through mandated sectoral representation in local legislative councils and 
membership of non-government organizations (NGOs) in local boards and committees. 
Moreover, the Code increased the access of local government units to financial resources 
by broadening local taxing powers, by allotting a share of revenues generated from the 
xiv 
 
exploitation of local natural resources to local governments, and by increasing local 
governments’ share of national taxes--the internal revenue allotment (IRA)—to 40 
percent. 
The 1991 LGC is currently well into the stabilization phase of its implementation, 
in which local governments have generally developed capacities for more autonomy. The 
national government has transitioned into the role of a partner to local governments 
through its agencies’ provision of technical assistance for the delivery of devolved 
services. This, despite the failure to fully devolve services to the environmental, 
questions about the justness of revenue-sharing scheme between the national and local 
governments, certain actions of central agencies that tend to undermine local autonomy, 
and continuing efforts in the legislature to limit the extent of decentralization reforms, not 
to mention the disruptive effect of congressmen’s use of pork barrel funds on 
implementation of local plans (Brillantes, 2003). While there might be variation in 
performance across the country, the decentralized system provides local governments 
with more elbow room to exercise strategic decision making in the allocation of available 
resources toward public goods delivery.  
Characteristics of Philippine Municipal Governments 
In the Philippines, local government units (LGUs)  refer to provinces, cities, 
municipalities and barangays. Municipalities are in the middle of the hierarchy, with 
provinces and highly urbanized cities above and village-level governments or barangays 
below (see Figure1).  
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FIGURE 1: Hierarchy of the Philippine local government system 
 
Municipal governments are differentiated from city governments according to 
population, land area and income criteria.  According to the 1991 LGC, a jurisdiction 
qualifies as a city if it has at least an average annual income of 20 million pesos, and 
either a population size of at least 150,000 or land area of at least 100 square kilometers. 
On the other hand, a municipality must have at least 25,000 residents, land area of 50 
square kilometers and average annual income of 2.5 million pesos. There are currently 
1491 municipalities in the Philippines, which are classified into six income classes (see 
Table 1).  Most of the municipalities belonging to the lower income tiers have 
agriculture-based economies. 
A municipal government is led by a popularly elected mayor who exercises all 
executive authority over the LGU’s daily affairs. The mayor sets the direction and fiscal 
strategies of the LGU. He or she has ultimate control over the day-to-day management of 
the government, including the administration of personnel. The municipal government 
also has a municipal council or “Sangguniang Bayan,” which is the local law-making 
body composed of the elected vice mayor who presides over the meetings, eight 
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councilors, and representatives from the youth council and the League of Barangays. All 
elected municipal officials have renewable tenures of three years, with a limit of three 
consecutive terms.  
In theory, the mayor and the council operate under a system of checks and 
balances. Aside from passing ordinances regarding various local issues brought to its 
floor, the municipal council discusses and approves the municipal budget, investment and 
other fiscal plans proposed by the local executive. The mayor has the power to veto any 
law passed by the municipal council but the council has the power to override the veto 
through a vote of two thirds of its members. It is not known, however, whether mayors’ 
veto powers or municipal council challenges to proposed budgets have been frequently 
exercised. In any case, the influence of the mayor in day-to-day running of the municipal 
government and in local policy making is well established. This system of the strong 
leadership and direction by the mayor has been dubbed the “command and control” 
model of good local governance (DAP, 2005).  
Another aspect of the municipal government’s character is its relationship with 
the national government. The level of political autonomy that the 1991 LGC gave local 
governments has not completely done away with the supervisory role of the national 
government. This supervision by the national government, carried out by the Department 
of Interior and Local Government (DILG) of the executive branch, has enabled it to 
foster coordination and cooperation among LGUs in order to promote their autonomy and 
efficient performance.  The LGC expanded the local revenue opportunities of 
municipalities by raising limits on taxes, fees and other charges that they can impose, 
increasing their share of real property taxes, and allowing them to form partnerships, 
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borrow and generate funds for local development plans. The law also expanded the share 
of LGUs in national revenues or internal revenue allotments (IRA) from 11 percent to 40 
percent.  
IRAs for LGUs is distributed among the different levels, with municipalities 
receiving the highest proportion at 34 percent while provinces and cities get 23 percent 
each and barangays receiving 20 percent. The IRA for municipalities is further 
distributed based mainly on population and land area. These intergovernmental financial 
transfers have been funding much of the expenditure responsibilities of local 
governments rather than locally generated revenues. In a recent report, IRA allotments 
cover about 90 percent of the expenses of municipalities (COA, 2011).  Since the amount 
of resources received by municipalities is based on legally stipulated formula, it should 
not render them politically beholden to the central government. However, heavy 
dependence on intergovernmental fund transfers for the municipality’s service delivery 
activities limits the flexibility of municipal governments in the conduct of their devolved 
roles. It renders local revenue-generation as less necessary in funding the municipality’s 
service delivery activities. Moreover, such level of dependence on intergovernmental 
transfers could limit innovations in local service delivery, especially when innovations 
require non-incremental changes in local fiscal allocations.  
Cabo (1998) describes the hierarchical administrative structure of Philippine 
LGUs as a system of inter-local supervision by the higher tier of government over the 
lower level. These supervisory relationships between local government levels have 
promoted accountability and collaborative relationships among the LGUs. To illustrate, 
provincial governments perform review functions over municipal ordinances and other 
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important decisions while municipal governments look over ordinances and other 
decisions passed by the barangays. The authority of the superior level of government also 
extends to the oversight and disciplining of the conduct of officials of the lower LGUs. In 
turn, the provincial governments are directly supervised by the Philippine president.  
Municipalities are also organized into a voluntary national organization, the 
League of Municipalities of the Philippines (LMP). Under the LMP are three island-
cluster organizations that annually meet for conferences, as well as provincial groups in 
which local mayors more frequently interact throughout the year. The LMP has been a 
forum for mayors to discuss concerns and collaborate on solutions, be it through policy 
advocacies for expansion of LGUs’ governance roles or through jointly organized 
capacity building programs. 
Municipal Governance of Agricultural Service Delivery: Three Inquiries 
Decentralization reforms have redefined the role of municipal governments in the 
Philippines as providers of public goods. Massive devolution of public services has 
strengthened the authority and ability of these local governments to select the types of 
policies, programs and services deemed relevant to their localities’ needs. Delivery of 
agricultural support is one of the responsibilities formally devolved to local governments 
by the 1991 LGC. Prior to the law, local governments have already been partnering with 
the national government in providing assistance to the sector of agriculture. Since the 
Department of Agriculture (DA) had been detailing field personnel to local governments, 
an existing personnel and administrative structure only eased the devolution of 
agricultural services (Tapales, Padilla & Joaquin, 1998). An interesting mark of 
devolution’s progress was the staffing of municipal governments with agriculture officers 
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despite the fact that the 1991 LGC only mandated such appointments for the provincial 
governments. Henceforth, municipal governments have been undertaking and supervising 
the delivery of agricultural services to their respective jurisdictions, in parallel efforts to 
those of provincial government.  
Philippine municipal governments best illustrate the opportunities and dilemmas 
of agricultural service delivery under a decentralized system. Being closer to the 
community than the national and provincial governments, these LGUs have greater 
awareness of local concerns, enabling their leaders to determine where to place 
agricultural service delivery in their list of priorities.  However, these municipalities are 
as much prone to elite capture as any local government in a decentralized setting.  They 
also face limitations in their technical capacity and resources, as well as scale 
diseconomies of producing public services to a smaller clientele. This dissertation is 
premised in these opportunities and dilemmas shaping local governance of agricultural 
services delivery.  
The first essay drew from archives of performance and fiscal data to investigate 
the influence of share of the rural constituency, fiscal variables and provincial 
government performance on the municipal government’s performance of agricultural 
support.  It primarily set out to examine whether the municipal government’s 
performance in providing agricultural support is significantly linked to local service 
demand as approximated by the rural constituency share in the population. To this ends, 
ot employed random effects ordinal logistic and panel logit regression. 
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The second essay is an inquiry into the determinants of agricultural services 
spending of municipalities of Bohol, an island-province in central Philippines. 
Recognizing the limitation of gross economic services spending data to actually reflect 
the municipal government’s budget policy toward agricultural support, local expenditure 
allocations for delivery of agricultural services were drawn from fiscal reports submitted 
by the municipalities to the Bureau of Local Government Finance (BLGF). Panel logistic 
regression was the conducted to investigate the influence of local factors and neighbor-
effects on municipal agricultural support spending.  
The third essay looks into an important aspect of local governance--- the process 
of policy learning toward adoption of innovations. Political decentralization has enabled 
municipal governments to make policy innovation choices that have crucial governance 
performance and outcomes for localities. These choices are preceded by a process of 
learning that fundamentally shapes the local leadership’s perceptions and receptiveness to 
a policy innovation. This study focused on the process of policy learning and investigated 
how socially mediated interactions between mayors explain their receptiveness to a new 
policy option---the promotion organic farming technology in the locality. Social network 
analysis (SNA) was applied to characterize the structural embeddedness of mayors, that 
is, their relationships and interlinkages with other mayors. Subsequently, these measures 
were used to examine whether mayors’ structural embeddedness relate to policy learning 
as manifested by patterns of convergence in receptiveness to a new policy. 
Studies in this dissertation emphasize the relevance of the municipal 
government’s role in the public delivery agricultural services for local and national 
development. More importantly, these studies shed light on the local governance process 
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that determines the path and pace of agricultural development. The first essay presents a 
picture of the agricultural support performance at the municipal level while the second 
essay takes a subset of municipalities for a closer look at the various determinants of 
local governments’ budgetary support for the agricultural sector.  The third essay 
provides another angle to local governance of agricultural service delivery through a 
focus on patterns of policy receptiveness among local executives. Through these studies, 
this dissertation stands to offer empirically drawn insights about devolved agricultural 
service delivery in the developing country context of the Philippines. 
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CHAPTER 1: MUNICIPAL AGRICULTURAL SUPPORT IN THE PHILIPPINES: 
DOES PERFORMANCE CORRESPOND TO RURAL CLIENTELE SHARE?  
 
1.1 Introduction  
Agricultural support is one of the key public services that the 1991 Local 
Government Code (LGC) devolved to Philippine local governments. Despite the concern 
about this new role becoming overshadowed by flagship program activities of national 
agencies (Legazpi, 2001), it remains that local government units (LGUs) now have 
greater authority and flexibility to fit national agricultural programs and even innovate 
local policies according to perceived needs in their jurisdictions. The decentralization 
reforms have enabled municipal governments to determine the path and intensity of 
agricultural support in local areas. Since most of the municipalities in the country have 
rural-based economies, these LGUs can be deemed as drivers of local development in the 
greater countryside. 
Decades since the devolution, the economic growth and welfare outcomes that 
defined rural development under the decentralized system of agricultural service delivery 
are modest at the aggregate level. The agricultural, fishery and forestry sectors have 
grown at an average of three percent from 2001 to 2010 (NSCB, 2013). During the same 
period, the agricultural sector has failed to catch up with rapid growth in the industry and 
service sectors, thereby reducing its share of workforce employment by 15 percent 
(DOLE, 2013). Poverty incidence has declined significantly for the entire country by  
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about 27 percent from 1991 to 2012 but the numbers remain highest in the countryside 
(NSCB, 2012). Among the factors that could be associated with these outcomes, local 
governments’ performance as frontline providers of extension and other forms of support 
to the agricultural sector is arguably the most direct and highly substantial.  
Unfortunately, little is known about how municipal governments have fared in the 
rendering agricultural support, much less, whether their performance actually 
corresponds to the perceivable local needs, as originally envisioned for the devolution. 
Apart from an earlier field report (ARD, 1998) noting the greater tendency of mayors 
from rural areas to favor the implementation of agricultural programs, the question of 
locally responsive agricultural service delivery has not been much scrutinized.  
At this point in the LGC’s implementation, this study has addressed such curiosity 
by examining whether the municipal government’s performance in providing agricultural 
support is significantly influenced by the rural constituency share in the population, 
among other determinants of performance. Using consolidated data for Philippine 
municipalities from 2009 to 2011, this study has estimated the performance level of 
municipal agricultural support as determined by demographic, fiscal and provincial 
government performance. In examining the local government’s responsiveness to local 
service demand through focus on the influence of the rural constituency share, this study 
also investigated how this hypothesized predictor variable moderates by the effect of 
targeted spending for economic services. The analyses revealed issues with attributing 
local demand effects on performance through the use of rural constituency share while 
providing support for the significant influence of municipal income, share of internal 
revenue allotment (IRA) in that income, and the provincial government’s performance. 
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This study contributes to the literature by presenting devolved service delivery in 
the developing country context of the Philippines. It highlights a less examined though 
very relevant service to a major economic sector in the country--- agricultural support. It 
is also one of the first efforts to consolidate and scrutinize a countrywide, multi-period 
survey of Philippine municipal government performance in recent years.. Moreover, it 
embodies several aspects of governance research through its focus on municipal 
government performance in devolved agricultural service delivery in the Philippines.  
The study is primarily an inquiry into determinants of public service performance, 
which itself is multi-faceted. The performance measure used in this inquiry identifies 
with economy, efficiency and effectiveness— three dimensions of performance in the 
3Es model, as well as with the IOO model of performance which focuses on inputs, 
outputs, and outcomes (Walker et al., 2010).  However, it distinguishes its approach to 
the research question by revisiting a major premise for decentralization reforms—local 
government responsiveness to local demands—through the inclusion of rural clientele 
share as an objective measure of responsiveness. As findings have yielded a different 
story with regard to anticipated local responsiveness of service performance, this paper 
offers its own conjectures while also discussing the policy and research implications for 
the rest of the findings. 
The subsequent section goes over the scholarship that has investigated local 
government performance in various perspectives and scenarios. It is followed by a 
presentation of the empirical design implemented to address the research question. Next 
are sections presenting the results and a section that discusses these findings. The final 
section addresses issues and implications for policy and further research. 
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1.2 Related Literature  
Empirical research tackling the relationship between public management and 
performance has been an enduring theme in public administration research. The 
accumulation of studies investigating the subject is sustained by continued interest from 
practitioners and stakeholders in the practicable implications of the research findings. 
This strand of inquiry’s appeal comes from the constant goal of developing of high 
quality and satisfactory public service provision.  
The body of literature does not lean on a singularly established theory of 
government performance. Reviews of the scholarship instead observe the application 
several theoretical perspectives to wide-ranging empirical studies that investigate the 
determinants of performance (Boyne, 2003; Walker & Andrews, 2013).  One of these 
perspectives involves the application of economic theory, particularly in looking at the 
influence of scale economies on local government performance. Studies that apply this 
perspective have explored the influence of organizational size. For example, Newton 
(1982) argues that despite the democratic merits of smaller units of government, large 
local government units are at least as efficient as their smaller counterparts. Similarly, 
larger government units are credited for their greater capacity to allocate fixed production 
costs while deferring to their smaller counterparts when it comes to responsiveness and 
efficiency in service delivery (Boyne, 1998). The closely related bodies of research on 
intergovernmental collaboration (Agranoff & MacGuire 2003; Amirkhanyan, 2009) and 
service provision ownership and partnership arrangements (Christoffersen, Paldam, & 
Wurtz 2007; O’Toole & Meier, 2004) also fall under the economic theoretical 
perspective.  
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Another theoretical perspective identified from the government performance 
literature comprise of contingency theories of organization, which generally condition 
success to management strategies rather than on the form or traits of the government unit   
(Walker & Andrews, 2013). This perspective highlights the role of strategic planning in 
service delivery performance, as seen in studies that tested the impact of specific 
management strategies on performance. To cite one, Walker, et al. (2010) explored and 
found support for the influence of strategic management and managerial networking on 
service performance of local governments. Boyne’s (2003) review of empirical studies on 
the subject reveal the consistently observed effect of management reforms in public 
service performance.   
The third theoretical perspective identified by Walker and Andrews (2013) is the 
resource-based perspective, which the takes into account the relevance of material and 
human resources to the local government’s performance. The former is a rather 
straightforward factor since financial resources determine the level of spending toward 
service delivery activities; but its impact on performance is also argued to be contingent 
on effective management (Boyne, 2003). With regard to the significance of human 
resources, the perspective highlights the role of leaders and bureaucrats as comparably 
significant resources to the organization. This is clearly observable in the studies 
surveyed by Walker and Andrews (2013) which indicate the amount of attention 
managerial quality has received in management-performance research, particularly for 
the case of single-purpose public organizations in the US. In an alternative context, the 
significance of human resources is also tackled in terms of the impact of mayoral 
qualification on municipal government performance (Avellaneda, 2009). 
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The contingency and resource-based theoretical perspectives discussed in Walker 
and Andrews (2013) coincide with the two sets of variables that Boyne (2003) found as 
most consistent determinants of public service performance: those of resources and of 
management. Boyne evaluated five theoretical perspectives on the determinants of public 
service performance through a review of findings from a sample of empirical studies on 
the subject. He classified these perspectives into those of resources, regulation, 
organization, market structure and management. After finding thin and even 
contradictory results for the corresponding theoretical perspectives, Boyne de-emphasizes 
regulatory arrangements, organizational structure, size, and market structure as 
significant objects of public management reforms. He instead finds consistent support for 
the influence of financial resources and management reforms in service performance and 
hence prods future research toward the exploration of these two issues as well as the 
examination of moderated and mediated relationships among the identified determinants. 
Scholars of decentralization view the increasing roles of local governments in 
service delivery as a form of governance reform, particularly in developing countries that 
come from centralized governance tradition (Andrews & Shah, 2003; Dillinger, 1994). 
The process is expected to promote service delivery performance by building a closer 
relationship between local officials and citizens. Narrowed distance between political 
agents and their citizen-clients can bridge information gaps with regard to the efforts of 
the political agents in the delivery of devolved public services (Keefer,Narayan & 
Vishwanath, 2003). As the responsibility for the delivery of public services is devolved to 
the local governments, political factors become relevant to performance.  
Decentralization research in developing country settings have focused on political factors 
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representing the democratic advantages of service delivery through local governments. 
Eckardt (2008) explores the interactions between political institutions and public sector 
performance. He finds evidence in Indonesia that the extent of political accountability, 
either through sanctions on public servants’ opportunistic behavior or narrowed-down 
informational gaps about government activities, determines performance outcomes. 
Gottlieb (2010) similarly points to the influence of political competition and information 
asymmetry on government performance in Mali. Other works in the context of 
developing countries have looked into external voice, government transparency, and 
politicization (Kaufmann, Mehrez & Gurgur, 2002), partisanship (Jones, Sanguinettib & 
Tommasi, 2000), as well as participation and accountability (Blair, 2000).  
While decentralization research discussed above offers a complementing set of 
explanatory variables to those associated with the public management-performance 
research, much of its attention is toward the agent-client relationship between the local 
governments and their constituents. The “external voice” examined by Kaufmann, 
Mehrez and Gurgur (2002) specifically applies to the ability of citizens to express 
feedback to government performance but does not cover the communication of their 
service needs to local service providers. The latter is critical assumption to the argued 
advantage of local governments in ascertaining and responding to service demands in 
smaller, more homogenous constituencies (Oates, 1972). Although observations of social 
services in some developing country settings suggest that low demand does not 
necessarily explain failures in service provision (Keefer & Khemani, 2005), the effect of 
service demand from the local constituency, has yet to be empirically established, 
particularly for other types of public services. 
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The breadth of the research on local service delivery provides a wealth of 
information to explain performance. Much of the research exploring the link between 
public management traits and strategies has come from the American context, with 
growing contributions from other country settings (Boyne, 2003; Walker & Andrews, 
2013; Blair, 2000 among others). Local governments in developing countries that later 
joined the decentralization trend however deal with different political dynamics than 
most of their Western counterparts do. Moreover, every country-case is characterized by 
its own unique political, economic and institutional context to which geographically 
generalized findings have limited applicability in terms of guiding policy making toward 
improved service delivery. This study provides the context of Philippine municipal 
government performance but also for casting light into agricultural support, one of the 
key public services devolved to local governments in the country yet the least examined 
in the entire literature. 
1.3 Hypotheses 
One of the advantages attributed to devolution is the bridging of the distance 
between the government and the citizens. As certain service delivery responsibilities are 
given to local governments, the gains in responsive service delivery may be realized 
through efficiency and downward accountability. From the economic efficiency 
argument, local governments are seen to more easily ascertain and respond to the local 
service needs (Oates, 1972). This is because smaller populations in local areas are less 
likely to be as diverse as the populations served by higher level of governments, making 
service priority choices simpler. At the same time, elected local officials become 
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politically accountable for satisfactory provision of devolved public services and are 
hence motivated to perform at the level acceptable to voters.  
The influence of devolution is complicated by a few challenges such as the threat 
of elite capture, or when local officials develop economic and political incentives to 
accommodate interests of dominant groups in the community (Cheema & Rondinelli, 
2007; Bardhan, 2002; Ashley & Maxwell, 2001 Crook & Manor, 1998; Tanzi, 1995). 
Another challenge to local service delivery is capacity limitations of the LGU. For one, 
additional responsibilities exert a strain on local government resources despite expanded 
financial transfers from the national government. At the same time, disparities in local 
economic conditions that translate into locally generated revenues can result in uneven 
financial capacities to fund public services (Bahl, 2009).  Furthermore, the limits in 
technical and management capacity to efficiently produce and deliver public goods can 
hinder performance for services like agricultural support (Andersson, Gordillo de Anda 
and Van Laerhoven, 2009).  
This study takes in the efficiency and accountability arguments for local service 
delivery, along with the posited influences of local political dynamics and the 
organizational traits of the local government, in order to examine the determinants of 
agricultural support performance of municipal governments in the Philippines.  In so 
doing, it considers the public management factors that have long been subject of public 
administration scholarship, as well as the political factors deemed to arise from the 
devolution as described above. It also takes into account other influences that are external 
to the LGU such as the provincial government’s own performance. 
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In most of the studies that investigate how public service delivery performance 
may be explained by organizational traits, management, political and other factors, it 
would seem that the demand for particular services have been considered constant for all 
units. Such assumption seems reasonable for services that pertain to common basic needs 
of local citizens such as public order and safety, education, health and the like. In the case 
of the Philippines, however, the devolved responsibility of providing agricultural support 
may not be equally prioritized by local governments. Despite the earlier argument of 
higher degrees of homogeneity at the local level, some municipalities are simply more 
rural than others. Variations in the degrees of homogeneity among local constituencies, 
particularly in terms of dependence on the agricultural sector for livelihood, matter to 
how much local governments prioritize this sector-specific service. Some municipal 
governments may hence exhibit a higher level of support for the agricultural sector as a 
response to a relatively larger rural constituency. Conversely, low performance of 
agricultural support may only be a corresponding result of a relatively smaller rural 
constituency whose needs and political pull on the local government are overwhelmed by 
those of citizens from other sectors. This study tests such influence of the rural 
constituency’s relative size on agricultural support performance. 
1.3.1 Municipalities with higher proportions of rural constituents will 
exhibit higher performance levels for agricultural support. 
 
The amount of available financial resources limits local government activities. 
Regardless of a municipality’s priorities, a bigger pie or an increase in funds is expected 
to boost capacity to deliver services, including those for support of the agricultural sector. 
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This study tests whether municipalities that have more financial resources will exhibit 
higher level of support for the agricultural sector. 
1.3.2 Higher income municipalities will exhibit higher levels of agricultural 
service delivery performance 
 
 
The Philippine’s experience of decentralization reforms brings in another context 
to the influence of financial resources on local service delivery. While the 1991 LGC 
increased revenue-generating opportunities for municipal governments, the expanded 
internal revenue allotments (IRA) to LGUs continue to fund much of the expenditure 
responsibilities of municipal governments. Heavy dependence on these 
intergovernmental fund transfers indicates some difficulty in generating more resources 
from the local economic base, either due to limited capacity of the LGU or lack of 
opportunities in the locality’s weak economic base or a combination of both. This can 
curb the flexibility of municipal governments in service delivery as they face practically 
fixed budget constraints in the IRA. Municipalities that are less dependent on IRA are 
hence expected to exhibit higher levels of support to the agricultural sector.  
1.3.3 Less IRA-dependent municipalities will show higher levels of 
agricultural service delivery performance. 
 
Local governments in the country regularly allot a significant proportion of their 
resources toward provision of economic services. This account covers funding for 
poverty alleviation and other development projects and activities in the jurisdiction. 
Agriculture is one of the main service sectors under the umbrella of economic services in 
a municipality. Increased investment of resources toward delivery of economic services is 
hence expected to positively affect the delivery of agricultural services in the area. If 
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agriculture is the major economic base of the locality, the effect of increase in the 
economic services on the support for the sector would more likely be greater. This study 
therefore also expects to find a moderating effect of the relative significance of the 
agriculture sector in the community on the relationship between the intensity of the 
municipal government’s economic services and its performance in the delivery of 
services to the agricultural sector. 
1.3.4 Municipalities that have a higher share of economic services 
spending  will exhibit higher performance levels of in agricultural 
service delivery, and  
 
1.3.5 The influence of the share of economic services spending on the 
performance of agricultural support is higher in more rural areas. 
 
 
Just like municipalities, provincial governments are mandated to provide support 
to the agricultural sector. Being at the higher level of the local government hierarchy, 
provincial governments are endowed with more resources and authority over all the 
devolved services. These LGUs subject municipalities to administrative supervision and 
influence over a wide array of political concerns. The provincial government’s  
performance in supporting of the agricultural sector can promote or hinder municipal 
performance, not only through direct provision of resources from the higher government 
tier, but also through the indirect transfer of standards regarding local agricultural service 
delivery. This study tests such relationship.  
1.3.6 Municipal performance of agricultural sector support is 
higher for high-performing provinces. 
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1.4 Data and Methodology 
The hypotheses were tested using an unbalanced panel dataset profiling 1617 city 
and municipal governments assessed for agricultural support performance in the Local 
Government Performance Monitoring System (LGPMS) from 2009 to 2011. LGPMS is a 
web-based self-assessment tool developed by the Department of the Interior and Local 
Government’s (DILG) Bureau of Local Government Supervision (BLGS). It is designed 
to aid the measurement and monitoring of local government capacities and limitations in 
the delivery of essential public services (Wilde, et al., 2008). LGPMS publishes the local 
government performance ratings generated from indicators reported by LGUs on 17 
service areas. Only about one percent of all LGUs at this sub-provincial level, mostly 
highly urbanized cities with very small or otherwise non-existent agricultural sector, were 
excluded from the LGPMS reports. In the Philippines, cities are distinguished from 
municipalities based on income, land area and population characteristics. Cities 
essentially have more urban areas than municipalities although most cities outside the 
national capital region (NCR) have a significant local agricultural sector and maintain 
agricultural service delivery functions. Except for highly urbanized and independent 
component cities which are not under the administrative supervision of the provincial 
government, there is very little difference in the operation of city and municipal 
governments. The exclusion of these types of LGUs from the LGPMS therefore enables 
the analyses to relax any influence of the differences in degrees of political autonomy 
from the provincial government. The city and municipal governments used in the 
analyses are collectively in the paper as municipal governments. 
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An election cycle for Philippine local governments is three years. Since the panel 
data covers three consecutive years, it can account for any fluctuations in performance 
that may arise from opportunistic behavior in the local governments, particularly during 
pre-electoral periods when public expenditures and activities are adjusted for higher 
visibility to the electorate (Veiga & Veiga, 2007). Income sources, spending allocations, 
demographic and electoral statistics, and service delivery performance were gathered 
from archives of government agencies such as the Bureau of Local Government Finance 
(BLGF), the Commission on Elections (COMELEC), the National Statistics Coordination 
Board (NSCB) and the Bureau of Local Government Supervision (BLGS).  
1.4.1 The Dependent Variable 
Local government service performance is conceptualized and classified in 
different ways. The way that the Local Government Performance Management System 
(LGPMS) draws performance scores from input, productivity and outcome indicators 
(Wilde, et al., 2008) corresponds to at least two models that have summarized the 
dimensions of performance. One is the 3Es model which emphasizes economy, efficiency 
and effectiveness and the other is the IOO model which focuses on inputs, outputs, and 
outcomes (IOO) of the service (Walker et al., 2010).  This study identifies with both 
models, at least in terms of the focus on the 3Es and the input-output aspects of 
performance, as it takes advantage of a welcome innovation in the LGPMS. 
LGPMS performance ratings range from 1 to 5, with a rating 5 indicating 
excellent performance and a rating of 1 signifying very low performance. In the LGPMS, 
LGUs earning less-than “Excellent” ratings can benefit from a report of suggested 
improvements in their operation. A sample performance assessment report is attached 
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(Appendix A) to illustrate the kind of feedback provided to the LGU.  While the LGPMS 
has served as a resource for use in local administrative and policy decision making as 
well as for establishing performance benchmarks, it has an wealth of data that could shed 
light into the comparative of local service delivery in the country. This resource is tapped 
to operationalize the performance of municipal governments in delivering agricultural 
support services in their localities. Corresponding LGPMS ratings are utilized as values 
for the dependent variable in the model for agricultural service delivery performance.  
Although originally reported as continuous score values, performance is interpreted in 
LGPMS according to the five performance ratings described here. This study uses the 
categorical ratings received by each municipality, setting the dependent variable to the 
ordinal format. This dependent variable is labeled in the estimations as MUNAG. 
In the LGPMS, performance ratings are drawn from information submitted by 
local government representatives. A sample data capture form is attached (Appendix B) 
to illustrate how such information is obtained. At reporting, local officials provide 
information about the extent to which the LGU funded construction or rehabilitation of 
irrigation facilities and necessary roads. They also indicate any type of provision for post-
harvest equipment as well as for credit facilitation, production support, research and 
development, and marketing services. Additionally, these officials submit self-assessed 
accounts of impact to target beneficiaries and service innovations.  Such information is 
stored in the system as raw data and also used as input to an automated performance 
report made available to the LGUs and the public. Considering that the information 
entered into the system are essentially subjective assessments of the reporting local 
official (as opposed to raw statistics), the information used in the computation of the 
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LGPMS score may run into questions of validity. For the part of the LGPMS team, the 
issue of validity is addressed by requiring LGU respondents to affix their signatures in a 
certification page attached to the data capture form as a means of testifying the validity of 
the provided information (LGPMS, 2009). 
1.4.2 Independent Variables  
1.4.2.1 Rural Constituency 
The term, “rural” has strong association with agriculture. This is very true in the 
Philippines where agriculture is known to play a major role in generating income and 
employment in the country’s rural areas. The National Statistical Coordination Board 
(NSCB, 2012) simply relates rural areas with low population density. The term connotes 
greater availability of land, which for most of the countryside, is utilized for agricultural 
activities. In considering the role of local demand in the local government’s performance 
of agricultural service delivery, a measure of the agricultural sector’s relevance to the 
municipality is valuable. In order to account for such influence, this study uses the 
proportion of the rural population to approximate perceivable local demand for 
agricultural support. Values for this variable were drawn from village-level census data 
published in the NSCB database as well as from estimates based on reported annual 
growth rates for population. 
1.4.2.2 Financial Determinants 
Values for all the financial resource variables used in the model are based on the 
consolidated municipal statements of income and expenditure (SIE) archived at the 
BLGF website. The municipal government’s annual gross revenue (REV) is used here to 
account for the influence of financial resources on local government service delivery 
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performance. It is equivalent to the gross amount of funds available to the municipal 
government for allocation toward agricultural support.  
Transfers from the central government called Internal Revenue Allotments (IRA) 
contribute to the local government’s revenues. IRA amounts are based mainly on 
population and geographic size of the jurisdiction. The share of the IRA in the LGU’s 
financial resources indicates the extent of its entrepreneurial capacity to generate 
revenues locally. This study computes the proportion of IRA-sourced funds to total 
revenues (similarly labeled as IRA) and uses it as a covariate in the performance model 
for municipal agricultural support.  
To account for the influence of economic sector support spending on agricultural 
support performance, the share of this expenditure item in the over-all expenditure of the 
LGU was computed. This variable, labeled as ECON, includes all expenditures toward 
promotion of economic growth for the municipality and is hence considered as influential 
to poverty alleviation goals. It is also multiplied with the rural constituency share to 
capture any moderating effect the latter may have on the expenditure share’s influence on 
performance. 
1.4.2.3 Provincial Government Performance 
The LGPMS also publishes performance scores for provincial governments’ 
delivery of support services to the agricultural sector at their level. Information for the 
provincial government performance is gathered in the same way as those for municipal 
governments. These provincial-level performance scores (PROV) were used as 
explanatory variables in the model for the municipal government’s performance.  
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1.4.3 Model and Estimation Technique 
Since agricultural service performance is represented in the dataset in terms of 
ranked categories, ordinal logistic estimation was seemingly the appropriate technique to 
model the influence of the hypothesized determinants on municipal performance. 
However, as the model is applied to cross-sectional data, it may be limited in addressing 
the heterogeneity of municipalities across the archipelago. There are traits of these LGUs 
that are crucial to explaining agricultural service delivery performance, yet can be missed 
in the estimations. One such characteristic is “competency” which is equivalent to 
professional and entrepreneurial skills of designated staff. Since such information is 
difficult to measure for each subject, more so for all municipal governments in the study, 
the variable cannot be included as regressor in the model for agricultural support 
performance. Omission of this variable can lead to bias in the estimates.  
By using panel data, this study can control for competency characteristics that are 
specific to each municipality. This is particularly important since measures of staff 
competency are not available for analysis, yet are crucial in determining performance of 
the LGU. The primary estimation method applied here is random effects ordinal logistic 
estimation for panel data. It looks into how the relative significance of the sector 
influences the municipality’s performance in this area while also testing the relationship 
between the local government’s extent of economic service delivery, fiscal capacities and 
the external influence of the provincial government’s support for the agricultural sector. 
The general model below is estimated for 1617 unique municipalities in the Philippines 
over a period of three years through maximum likelihood estimation. 
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                                    MUNAG it *  =  xitβ + νi + εit 
              and  
(1.1) 
    1 (Very Poor)   if MUNAG it * ≤ k1 
    2 (Poor)   if k1 < MUNAG it * ≤ k2 
MUNAG it  = 3 (Fair)   if k2 < MUNAG it * ≤ k3 
    4 (High but not Excellent) if k3 < MUNAG it * ≤ k4 
    5 (Excellent)   if k4 < MUNAG it * 
 
The equation in 1.1 is the latent linear response model from which observed 
ordinal responses MUNAGit are generated. In the equation, i represents each municipality 
over each year t.  The covariates of interest are represented by xit. The errors εit are 
distributed as logistic with mean zero and variance νi  
  
 
 , and are independent of νi. In 
the estimation of this model in Stata13, the assumption of identically distributed 
disturbances is alternatively relaxed by employing a clustered sandwich estimator for the 
variance-covariance matrix (VCE). Use of this VCE specification is deemed unbiased 
cluster-correlated data (Williams, 2000). In this study, municipal ID was selected as the 
clustering variable. 
1.5 Results 
1.5.1 Trend and Distribution of Municipal Performance 
The performance ratings of agricultural sector support of municipalities across the 
country for each year are illustrated in the Figures 1.1, 1.2 and 1.3. A perfect score of 5 
(represented by blue color) denotes excellent performance. Performance scores of 4 to 1 
indicate increasing degrees of improvement needs for the LGU. Green-shaded 
municipalities are those that exhibited high level performance but still have some areas 
that need improvement. The light yellow-shaded municipalities indicate fair performance 
while the light and dark red-shaded ones have poor and very poor ratings, respectively. 
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Overview of all three maps gives an idea of the prevalence of “High but Not Excellent” 
ratings (green color) in any of the years. On the other hand, the “Excellent” performers 
are spread out in 13 of the 16 regions of the country. 
Table 1.1 summarizes the distribution of the municipalities according to the five 
levels of agricultural support performance rating. On average, about 53 percent of the 
municipalities received a rating of “High but Not Excellent” performance. On the other 
hand, municipalities that were rated “Excellent” make up only one to two percent. About 
32 percent received “Fair” rating. Poor and very poor performing municipalities together 
make up 13 percent. The trend over the three-year period seems to be a very slow 
movement of the lower performing municipalities toward higher performance rating 
categories. The discussion of the regression estimates in the later part of this section 
looks into such variations in municipal service delivery performance across 
municipalities and time. 
TABLE 1.1: Distribution of municipalities by agricultural support performance. 
No. % No. % No. %
Excellent 19 1 24 2 39 2
High 750 49 811 51 929 58
Fair 527 34 539 34 464 29
Low 161 11 140 9 100 6
Very Low 74 5 75 5 62 4
Total 1531 100 1589 100 1594 100
2009 2010 2011Performance 
Rating
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 FIGURE 1.1: Agricultural service delivery performance by municipality, 2009. 
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 FIGURE 1.2: Agricultural service delivery performance by municipality, 2010.  
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FIGURE 1.3: Agricultural service delivery performance by municipality, 2011. 
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1.5.2 Measures of the Explanatory Variables 
To provide a general picture of rural clientele share across the country’s municipalities, 
regional averages were computed and presented in Figure 4. Two major observations can 
be noted. First, the proportion of the rural constituency does not significantly fluctuate 
from 2009 to 2011. This trend is not surprising, given the shortness of the panel period 
covered. With the exception of the event of disaster (as experienced by a few provinces in 
the aftermath of Haiyan last year), local populations are not expected to exhibit drastic 
movements within a span of three years. It is hence conceptually and practically sound to 
assume that rural clientele share is a time-invariant variable in the model. Secondly, the 
proportions of rural population were generally high across the municipalities, 
highlighting the continued relevance of the agricultural sector in the greater areas of the 
country. The relatively lower averages for Regions 3 (55 percent) and 4a (57 percent) are 
likely attributable to urban developments that have been spilling over from adjacent 
metropolitan areas of the national capital region. 
Table 1.2 reports of the summary statistics for rural constituency share in 
municipalities across the country for the years 2009 to 2011. The shares of rural 
constituents in the populations of cities and municipalities range from zero to 100 
percent. The mean for this variable is 75 percent with a standard deviation of 26 percent. 
Its distribution is negatively skewed and heavy tailed (Figure 1.4). Table 1.3 shows the 
distribution of municipalities into five value categories for rural constituency share. 
While about eight percent of the municipalities have less than 20 percent of their 
populations living in rural areas, more than half of them have more than 80 percent rural 
constituency. About 30 percent of the municipalities can be classified as highly rural for 
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having over 90 percent rural population. On the other hand, only about 36 percent of the 
municipalities have rural constituency shares falling within the middle section of 20-80 
percent. Supplemental visual representations of this distribution are presented in 
Appendix C. 
 
TABLE 1.2: Descriptive statistics for rural clientele share (%). 
Statistics 2009 2010 2011
N 1604 1603 1606
Minimum 0 0 0
Maximum 100 100 100
Mean 75.03 75.08 75.11
Standard deviation 25.72 25.66 25.71
Variance 661.62 658.51 661.03
Skewness -1.78 -1.78 -1.78
Kurtosis 5.57 5.60 5.60  
 
 
 
TABLE 1.3: Municipalities by share of rural population. 
No. % No. % No. %
<10% 114 7 113 7 114 7
<20% 124 8 123 8 124 8
20-80% 575 36 575 36 573 36
>80% 905 56 905 56 909 57
>90% 484 30 484 30 487 30
Total 1604 1603 1606
Proportion of 
Rural Population
2009 2010 2011
 
 
 
The next set of explanatory variables considered in this study pertains to the fiscal 
traits of the LGU. Municipal income, the proportion of income coming from IRA 
transfers and the proportion of the expenditures that go to economic services spending are 
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summarized, along with relevant income and expenditure variables in Table 1.4.  The 
percentile distributions of these variables are presented in Table 1.5. 
Cities and municipalities are classified into several groups based on average 
annual incomes: six income classes for cities and another six for municipalities.  The 
spread of this variable’s distribution is extensive though more concentrated to the lower 
values. As presented in Table 1.4, annual municipal incomes range from PhP7.8 million 
to PhP4.8 billion.  Average income has grown from PhP113.6 in 2009 to PhP 
129.3million in 2011. In Table 1.5, three-fourths of the municipalities have incomes lying 
below the mean.  Figure 1.5 illustrates this pattern of distribution for income.  
Table 1.4 also shows that IRA generally makes up the bulk of the municipal 
government’s income. On average, income sourced from IRA transfers is well above 80 
percent. Derived from a set formula, the IRA received by a municipality is largely based 
on population and land area of the jurisdiction. It has become the main source of the 
LGU’s income especially for localities with weak economic base. Although some of the 
LGUs report little dependence on IRA, they represent a minority as reported in Table 1.5.  
Figure 1.6 confirms this distribution pattern. 
Economic services spending contribute to an average of 17 percent of the 
municipal government’s expenditures (Table 1.4). The rest of the public expenditures is 
allotted to general services and other devolved responsibilities such as provision of 
support to education, health, environment, and other concerns in the locality. As can be 
seen in both Table 1.5 and Figure 1.7, values for this variable are positively skewed, 
though not as much as municipal income. 
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TABLE 1.4: Descriptive statistics for income and expenditure variables. 
Variable 2009 2010 2011
Income (PhPmillion)
N 1604 1603 1606
Minimum 7.81 18.70 20.16
Maximum 4005.07 4296.51 4757.82
Mean 113.61 119.65 129.29
Standard deviation 227.78 221.63 237.39
Variance 51883.38 49120.14 56355.05
Skewness 9.18 8.71 8.83
Kurtosis 122.01 117.59 125.17
IRA Share (%)
N 1604 1603 1606
Minimum 9 11 13
Maximum 100 100 100
Mean 84 81 81
Standard deviation 14 16 15
Variance 201 250 217
Skewness -1.71 -1.56 -1.52
Kurtosis 6.52 5.41 5.62
Expenditure (PhPmillion)
N 1604 1603 1606
Min 6.98 14.36 15.00
Max 3440.55 4319.03 3449.29
Mean 86.65 93.27 99.51
Standard deviation 160.82 183.28 178.19
Variance 25863.12 33590.56 31753.17
Skewness 10.34 12.80 10.00
Kurtosis 165.53 243.43 153.44
Economic Services Spending Share (%)
N 1603 1603 1606
Min 0 2 0
Max 97 77 69
Mean 16 17 17
Standard deviation 10 9 9
Variance 99 85 74
Skewness 1.93 1.50 1.20
Kurtosis 10.48 7.57 5.96
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TABLE 1.5: Percentile distribution of fiscal variables, 2009-2011.
Percentile
Municipal 
Income 
(PhPmillion) IRA Share (%)
Economic 
Spending 
Share (%)
1% 23.97 30 3
5% 31.75 50 5
10% 37.28 62 7
25% 48.64 78 10
50% 66.31 86 15
75% 100.62 93 21
90% 179.69 97 28
95% 419.45 99 34
99% 1086.20 100 46
 
 
 
‘  
FIGURE 1.4: Distribution of municipal rural population share, 2009-2011. 
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The performance scores of provincial governments in agricultural service delivery 
were on average high (but not excellent) at 4.4. Figure 1.8 indicates that most of the 
municipalities belong to provinces that garnered performance scores close to this mean 
value. As with Table 1.1, provincial government performance scores were classified into 
the five performance levels and in turn became basis for the distribution of 
municipalities. In Table 1.6, about 86 percent of the municipalities were located in “high” 
and “excellent” performing provinces. Comparing the distributions in Tables 1.1 and 1.4, 
the number of municipalities in “excellently” performing provinces exceeds those of 
municipalities that are themselves performing “excellently”. 
 
TABLE 1.6: Distribution of municipalities by provincial government’s agricultural                     
support performance rating. 
No. % No. % No. %
Excellent 112 7 161 10 288 18
High 1156 76 1145 73 1177 73
Fair 195 13 219 14 120 7
Low 56 4 22 1 21 1
Very Low 0 0 17 1 0 0
Total 1519 100 1564 100 1606 100
   Performance 
Rating
2009 2010 2011
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FIGURE 1.5: Distribution of municipalities by income and year. 
 
 
 
 
FIGURE 1.6: Distribution of municipalities by IRA share and year. 
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FIGURE 1.7: Distribution of municipalities  
by economic spending share and year. 
 
 
 
 
 
FIGURE 1.8: Distribution of municipalities by  
provincial performance score and year. 
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TABLE 1.7: Participation pattern of municipalities. 
Pattern
No. of 
municipalities Percent
Cumulative 
%
Y1-Y2-Y3 1592 98.45 98.45
Y3 13 0.80 99.26
Y1-Y2 11 0.68 99.94
Y1-Y3 1 0.06 100.00
 
 
 
1.5.3 Estimation Results 
 A total of 1617 cities and municipalities evaluated by the LGPMS from 2009 to 
2011 made up the panel data set used in the estimation of the longtitudinal ordinal 
logistic regression model for the level of the agricultural support performance. These 
LGUs exclude those located in the highly urbanized national capital region. Each panel 
does not contain exactly the same number of observations but the imbalance was small. 
About 98 percent of the municipalities are represented by observations covering all three 
time points (Table 1.7). 
Collinearity statistics reported in Table 1.8 reveal issues with the share of 
economic service spending and the interaction of this variable with the rural constituency 
share. The multicollinearity problem however subsided when centered data for the two 
variables were used (Table 1.9). Estimation proceeds to use centered data for economic 
spending share and for the interaction term of including this variable. 
The parameter estimates, estimated cut-points, and the estimated panel-level 
variance are reported in Table 1.10. The Wald Chi-Square statistic indicates the model’s 
significance. The estimated variance component is 2.68 with standard error of 0.22. The 
likelihood ratio (LR) test statistic of 521.84 indicates that at one percent alpha, there is  
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significant variability between municipalities to favor random-effects ordered logistic 
regression over the standard ordered logistic regression. Standard errors were initially 
calculated through the use of the default variance–covariance (VCE) matrix specification-
--the observed information matrix (OIM), which is based on asymptotic maximum- 
likelihood theory. This VCE specification assumes the errors as independent and 
identically distributed normal. Alternatively, the same model is estimated through the use 
of a VCE type that relaxes the assumption of independence of the errors and allows intra- 
group correlation. The clustered robust VCE specification was deemed to control for any 
serial correlation issues for each unique subject, particularly for fiscal variables that 
might be planned by a municipal government with reference to previous periods. It does 
not change the values of parameter estimates. It yielded marginally different error values 
and Wald statistic but does not significantly affect the inferences that can be derived from 
the model. 
TABLE 1.8: Collinearity diagnostics (uncentered data). 
Variable VIF
SQRT 
VIF Tolerance
R-
Squared
Rural popn share (%) 4.19 2.05 0.2387 0.7613
Income (PhPmillion) 1.28 1.13 0.7809 0.2191
IRA share (%) 1.36 1.16 0.7378 0.2622
Provincial Score 1.03 1.01 0.9713 0.0287
Econ spending share (%) 8.21 2.87 0.1218 0.8782
Econ Spending * Rural 10.88 3.3 0.0919 0.9081
Mean VIF 4.49
Condition Number 37.22
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TABLE 1.9: Collinearity diagnostics (centered data for selected variables). 
Variable VIF
SQRT 
VIF Tolerance
R-
Squared
Rural popn share (%) 1.30 1.14 0.7699 0.2301
Income (PhPmillion) 1.28 1.13 0.7809 0.2191
IRA share (%) 1.36 1.16 0.7378 0.2622
Provincial Score 1.03 1.01 0.9713 0.0287
Econ spending share (%) 1.02 1.01 0.9788 0.0212
Econ Spending * Rural 1.01 1.01 0.9878 0.0122
Mean VIF 1.17
Condition Number 28.91
Note: Economic services spending share was centered while the 
interaction term was computed using centered data for rural population 
share and economic services spending share  
 
 
The coefficients in the model indicate the direction of the explanatory variables’ 
influence on the level of agricultural support performance of the municipal government. 
Among the hypothesized determinants, municipal income, IRA share and the provincial 
government’s performance score were statistically significant. In terms of odds ratios 
associated with these three variables, the influence of provincial government performance 
is noticeably greater than those of income and IRA share. 
In not finding a statistically significant relationship between rural constituency 
share and municipal agricultural support performance, the analyses challenge the notion 
of a “locally-responsive” municipal government, at least in terms of delivering a higher 
level of agricultural support to areas perceived to have high service demand.  Instead of 
automatically dismissing the municipal governments’ responsiveness to local needs for 
agricultural support, this unexpected result can also point to other means by which the 
effect of local demand is cancelled out by characteristics associated with having a high 
rural constituency. Revisiting the NSCB’s technical definition of a rural area, these are 
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communities with low population density. A low population-land area ratio can have 
conflicting implications for a municipality’s IRA receipts. An LGU’s IRA is mainly 
based on and positively influenced by population and geographic size of the jurisdiction. 
Among comparably sized municipalities in terms of land area, the more rural 
municipalities have fewer residents than their urban counterparts and hence, receive 
lower IRA transfers thereby negatively impacting the municipal income. The more rural 
municipalities typically have a smaller local tax base and fewer economic opportunities 
to generate incomes to augment IRA receipts. Municipalities with a greater share of rural 
population are therefore associated with lower municipal government income and higher 
dependence on IRA. The pairwise correlations of the explanatory variables in Table 1.11 
indicate these relationships. 
TABLE 1.10: Random effects ordinal logistic estimates, 2009-2011. 
Explanatory Variables Coeff se 
Robust 
se Odds Ratio
Rural Population Share (%) -0.002 0.002 0.002 0.998
Gross Income(PhPmillion) 0.001 0.000 0.000 1.001 ***
IRA-Share(%) -0.029 0.004 0.004 0.972 ***
Provincial Performance 0.476 0.077 0.084 1.609 ***
Econ Spending Share (%) 0.001 0.005 0.005 1.001
Econ Spending * Rural 0.000 0.000 0.000 1.000
cut1 -4.600 0.502 0.666 ***
cut2 -3.092 0.497 0.658 ***
cut3 -0.558 0.494 0.655
cut4 5.201 0.510 0.669 ***
Wald chi2(6) 186.84 *** 149.04 ***
sigma2 u 2.68 2.68
(0.22) (0.24)
chibar2(01) 521.84 ***
No. of groups 1611
N 4631
Note: ***p ≤ 0.01  
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TABLE 1.11: Means and correlation matrix for covariates, 2009-2011. 
Variable 1 2 3 4 5
1 Rural popn share (%) 1.000
2 Income (PhPmillion) -0.379 *** 1.000
3 IRA share (%) 0.407 *** -0.401 *** 1.000
4 Econ spending share (%) -0.024 0.068 *** -0.108 *** 1.000
5 Provincial Score -0.101 *** 0.058 *** -0.155 *** -0.005 1.000
Note: ***p ≤ 0.01  
 
 
A preliminary bivariate analysis, rural constituency share was found to 
significantly affect the municipal government’s agricultural support performance. 
However, the addition to the model of municipal income and IRA share resulted to the 
loss of that significant relationship, suggesting a mediating role of rural constituency 
share. In this case, the use of rural constituency share to represent perceivable agricultural 
services demand can muddle the examination of causality between local demand and 
agricultural support performance.  
The parameter estimates in Table 10 provides support for the positive influence of 
municipal income on agricultural support performance. Holding other variables constant, 
increases in the municipal government’s gross income improves its ordered log-odds of 
being at a higher performance level in the delivery of agricultural services. For a million 
peso increase in the municipal government’s gross income, the odds of earning an 
“excellent” rating over the any of the ‘lower’ ratings is 1.001 times greater.  Likewise, the 
same increase in gross income results in the odds of earning either “high” or “excellent” 
rating being greater by 1.001 times over the any of the lower ratings. Based on the 
model’s estimate and those of exploratory estimations that tested the influence of larger 
unit transformations of income, the income-effect on performance is rather small. 
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The model also shows that a higher proportion of the IRA-sourced municipal 
government income decreases the ordered log-odds of obtaining a higher performance 
rating. The parameter estimate indicates that each percent increase in IRA share 
significantly decreases the odds of higher performance level by 0.972 times. As with 
income, however, this impact is quite small.  
On the other hand, the ordered log-odds of a higher level of municipal 
performance in agricultural support improves with an improvement in the provincial 
government’s performance. A full unit increase in the provincial government’s score, 
improves the odds of higher performance level by 1.609 times for the municipal 
government. This result points to the relevance of the provincial government’s own 
stance and efforts toward effective delivery of agricultural services. Being the more 
powerful and larger government unit, the provincial government is well able to 
encourage, guide, and even materially supplement municipal governments’ efforts to 
delivery services to the local agricultural sector. 
The effect of economic services spending share and its interaction with the rural 
constituency share were not statistically significant in the model. These results may be 
due to the unremarkable share of economic services spending in the municipal budget. 
There might even be greater difficulty to attribute municipal performance to agriculture-
related development spending as it is an even smaller piece of the pie.  
To further look how rural clientele share might be associated with the municipal 
government’s performance of agricultural service delivery, the agricultural support 
performance model was estimated for three municipality groups based on the share of 
rural population. These models represent municipalities with less than ten percent rural 
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constituents (highly urban), those more with than 90 percent rural population (highly 
rural), and those in between. The estimates in Table 1.12 indicate consistent directions of 
influence by the municipal revenues, IRA share and provincial performance scores across 
the groups. It can also be noted that the magnitude of influence of the provincial 
government’s performance is qualitatively different for the extreme groups of 
municipalities, as evidenced by greater magnitude of effect for highly urban  and highly 
rural municipalities. On the other hand, the magnitudes of influence for municipal income 
and IRA dependence were only marginally different across the three municipality groups.  
Ordered logistic regression assumes that the coefficients describing the 
relationship between all pairs of ordered response categories are the same.  The odds 
ratios estimated here are cumulative odds of belonging to one category and those under it 
versus those of all other higher categories. This proportional odds or parallel regression 
assumption needs to be checked for validity in order to determine whether a more flexible 
model is required. If this assumption is violated, then the odds ratios should not be the 
same for all ordered response pairs. Since Stata does not have diagnostic tools directly 
applicable to ordered logistic panel models, this assumption was tested by first running  
ordered logistic regression without taking account of the panel nature of the data so that a 
Brant test can be employed.  
Results presented in Table 1.13 indicate that the parallel regression assumption 
was violated for the income, provincial performance and economic service spending, at 
the five percent level of significance. To address such issue, random effects logit models 
for each of the performance levels were estimated. This was done in consideration of the 
variability across municipalities that can be controlled for in a panel regression model. 
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The estimates, which are presented in Table 1.14, show the influence of independent 
variables on the odds of a municipality earning that particular level of agricultural 
support performance. Across the models, the influence of the provincial government’s 
performance was consistent and remarkable for the two lowest performance levels as we 
ll as for the high performance level. However, its effect was very small for the odds of 
earning a “fair” rating and insignificant for “excellent” performance. The influence of 
income was significant (though small) only in the lowest two performance ratings.  The 
IRA share also exhibited consistent though small effects on the odds of earning any of the 
four higher performance ratings. Economic spending share was found to have significant 
positive influence on the odds of an excellent performance rating. These findings suggest 
careful interpretation of the independent variables influence on municipal performance. 
As a final consideration following the failure to find support for the influence of 
rural constituency share in the random effects estimation of agricultural support 
performance, a Hausman test was conducted for the linear panel estimation of fixed and 
random effects models. This is to revisit the appropriateness of the random effects model 
visavis fixed effects, when the influence of the time-invariant rural constituency share is 
ignored. Results of this test (Table 1.15) reveal the sufficiency of fixed effects estimation 
in this scenario. However, the estimation of a fixed-effects ordered logit model that is 
comparable to the random effects model in Table 1.10 is more complex than its 
alternative. Introduction of municipality dummies to arrive at the same result did not 
work due to the shortness of the panel. In order to make relevant inference, a fixed-
effects linear model was estimated. It is reported alongside with a random-effects 
counterpart for comparison (Table 1.16). Results show that a fixed-effects estimation 
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does not provide support for the influence of IRA-share on performance. The 
improvement in this variable’s significance is improved by accounting for rural 
constituency share, to which it is positively correlated (Table 1.11). 
 
TABLE 1.12: Ordinal logistic estimates, by municipality group, 2009-2011.
DV: Agricultural Support Performance Level
Explanatory Variables
Municipal Revenues 1.001 ** 1.001 ** 1.006 ***
(0.000) (0.001) (0.002)
IRA-Share 0.986 0.970 *** 0.975 ***
(0.018) (0.005) (0.007)
Provincial Performance Score 2.509 ** 1.370 *** 2.069 ***
(1.173) (0.140) (0.313)
Econ Spending Share 1.095 0.999 1.060
(0.781) (0.006) (0.056)
Econ Spending * Rural 1.001 1.000 0.997
(0.010) (0.000) (0.002)
cut1 -1.406 -5.313 *** -2.600 ***
(2.697) (0.669) (0.984)
cut2 -0.066 -3.794 *** -1.079
(2.689) (0.661) (0.972)
cut3 2.384 -1.222 1.378
(2.718) (0.656) (0.964)
cut4 8.160 *** 4.557 *** 7.112 ***
(2.820) (0.677) (1.001)
Wald chi2(4) 21.68 *** 73.92 *** 55.20 ***
sigma2 u 3.88 2.48 2.62
(1.50) (0.28) (0.44)
No. of groups 109 1012 490
N 306 2928 1397
Notes: 
***p ≤ 0.01 ;  ** p ≤ 0.05
Robust standard errors in the parentheses
<10% Rural
Odds Ratio
10-90% Rural
Odds Ratio
>90% Rural
Odds Ratio
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TABLE 1.13: Test of the parallel regression assumption. 
Explanatory Variable
Odds 
Ratio chi2 p>chi2 df
Rural Population Share (%) 0.999 0.002 3.27 0.351 3
Income (PhPmillion) 1.001 *** 0.000 10.64 0.014 3
IRA-Share(%) 0.974 *** 0.003 7.05 0.070 3
Provincial Performance 1.554 *** 0.105 21.78 0.000 3
Econ Spending Share (%) 1.004 0.004 8.49 0.037 3
Econ Spending * Rural 1.000 0.000 1.78 0.620 3
ALL 49.90 0.000 18
cut1 -3.410 0.456
cut2 -2.228 0.447
cut3 -0.427 0.443
cut4 4.015 0.448
Wald chi2(6) 192.12 ***
Pseudo R2 0.0340
N 4631
Note: ***p ≤ 0.01
Ologit model (2009-2011) Brant test 
Robust 
se
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TABLE 1.15: Hausman test results. 
Fixed Random
Independent Variables (b) (B) (b-B)
Income (PhPmillion) 0.001 0.000 0.001
IRA share (%) 0.000 -0.007 0.007
Econ Spending Share 0.000 0.002 -0.002
Provincial Performance Score 0.077 0.168 -0.091
chi2(5) 50.30
Prob>chi2 0.000
0.017
Coefficients
Diff s.e.
sqrt(diag(V_b-V_B))
0.000
0.001
 
 
 
 
 
TABLE 1.16:  Panel estimates for agricultural services spending per capita, 2009-2011. 
Explanatory Variables Coefficient
Robust 
se Coefficient
Robust 
se
Rural population share (%) -0.001 0.001
Gross Income (PhPmillion) 0.001 *** 0.000 0.000 *** 0.000
IRA-Share (%) 0.000 0.002 -0.007 *** 0.001
Provincial Performance Score 0.077 ** 0.036 0.168 *** 0.030
Econ Spending Share (%) 0.000 0.002 0.002 0.004
Econ Spending*Rural 0.000 0.000
Constant 2.978 *** 0.230 3.253 *** 0.201
F(4,1610) 3.550 ***
Wald chi2(6) 165.83 ***
sigma_u 0.671 0.515
sigma_e 0.640 0.640
rho 0.524 0.393
Note: ***p < 0.01
             **  p < 0.05 
Fixed Effects Random Effects (GLS)
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1.6 Discussion and Conclusion 
Results of the analyses provide support for the expected influence of income, 
IRA-dependence and provincial government performance on the municipal government’s 
performance of its devolved responsibility of agricultural service delivery. On the other 
hand, the hypothesized effect of the rural clientele’s size was not supported by the 
regression estimates be it in the ordered logistic panel model or in the set of panel logit 
estimations. However, rural constituency share, in terms of its extreme values, revealed 
qualitative difference in the odds ratio estimates for provincial performance. These 
estimates were observed to be substantially higher for the highly urban and highly rural 
municipality groups. Results of the panel logit estimations also reveal that while the 
direction of influence were consistent for income, IRA share and provincial government 
performance, the effects of these variables are not significant for all performance levels. 
Economic spending share, which was not found to be significant in the ordered logit 
estimations was found to have a significant positive influence on the odds of attaining an 
excellent performance rating. The following discussion reflects on the logic and 
implications of these results 
In verifying the second hypothesis, the results underline the value of fiscal 
adequacy in effectively providing relevant agricultural services (Howell, 1985; Feder, 
Willet &Zijp, 2001; Anderson & Feder, 2003). Considering that the municipal 
government actually has to allocate its financial resources toward a number of other 
service responsibilities, income even modestly enhancing the performance of agricultural 
support serves to stress the point that “a bigger pie” is a crucial ingredient to effective 
service delivery. Providing and more importantly, sustaining the delivery of quality 
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support services entails ensuring that municipal governments have the necessary financial 
resources to expend. One more thing that could be picked up from the panel logit 
estimates in Table 1.14 is that a unit increase in municipal income significantly reduces 
the odds of ending up with a low or very low performance rating. 
Since not all municipalities are on equal footing in terms of locally generating 
needed funds, IRA has been seen as an equalizing mechanism to enable local 
governments to meet the corresponding service needs of their constituencies. Financial 
transfers from the central government like the IRA seem to be the convenient solution to 
address local agricultural support needs. However, results that validate the third 
hypothesis further qualify the convenience argument for stimulating the impact of 
municipal government incomes on the level agricultural support performance through 
IRAs. While IRAs directly increase the municipal government’s financial resources for 
service delivery, heavy dependence on these transfers has adverse effects on the service 
delivery performance of the municipal government. A high proportion of IRA-sourced 
income indicates the local government’s limited capacity to generate income from other 
sources. On one hand, it may just be that limited capacity is a result of a weak economic 
base from which little local revenues can be drawn. On the other hand, this tendency also 
says something about the fiscal management capacity of the local government, 
particularly in working around the limitations of a weak economic base. In the latter, IRA 
dependence serves to signal a broader measure of local government management capacity 
that ultimately determines the quality of its support to the agricultural sector. These 
findings emphasize the relevance of further strengthening municipal government capacity 
to address both fiscal and service delivery concerns. 
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The influence of the provincial government’s performance was also found to 
significantly improve the odds of higher performance of agricultural support. While the 
municipal government does have autonomy from the provincial government in 
determining its local service delivery strategies, the latter has some supervisory or 
oversight powers over the former. More importantly, there exists a close coordination and 
partnership relationship between the two levels of local government. For instance, the 
municipal agricultural officers are typically in regular communication with the office of 
the provincial agriculturist, which organizes consultative meetings and trainings for their 
municipal counterparts. The provincial government has greater material and human 
resources to pursue projects that involve and benefit the service objectives of municipal 
governments. It is hence not surprising that being under a higher performing provincial 
government tends to improve the performance of the municipal government in 
agricultural service delivery. Additionally, the notably larger odds ratios for provincial 
government performance in both the highly urban and rural municipality groups suggest 
that where agricultural is clearly the less significant sector, municipal performance of 
agricultural support reacts more to provincial government’s service delivery efforts. 
Ironically and perhaps due to relatively more limited resources for the typically lower 
income, highly rural municipalities, agricultural support performance similarly responds 
more to the initiatives and activities of the provincial government.  
As discussed in the previous section, the failure of the estimations to provide 
support for the direct influence of the rural clientele share on agricultural support 
performance can be attributed to its close association with IRA receipts and municipal 
income. A formula-based determination of IRA transfers basically ties in demographic 
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and geographic characteristics of the more rural municipalities to the amount of resources 
available to the municipal government for the conduct of its service responsibilities. As 
long as this is the case, rural constituency share cannot capture the local demand for 
agricultural services and be used as determinant of agricultural support performance. The 
effects of IRA and income will keep muddling any demand influence that rural 
constituency can represent. 
Results of the estimations in Table 1.14 qualify the hypothesized the influence of 
economic spending share on agricultural support performance as significant only when it 
comes to the odds of earning an “excellent” rating. This effect is modest though 
suggestive of the potential influence of targeted sector spending on service delivery 
performance. In retrospect, the use of economic spending share as a determinant of 
agricultural support performance is a bit of a stretch considering that agricultural service 
spending is only one component of the economic services portfolio.  Unfortunately, 
obtaining a more detailed breakdown of municipal economic services expenditures that 
identifies agricultural support spending for all municipalities in this study would take 
more time than what is already feasible for this dissertation project. The following essay 
looks further into the municipal fiscal spending for agricultural support in one of the 
provinces in the Philippines, with the objective of identifying its determinants.  
In summary, results of the analyses highlight the enduring theme of organizational 
capacity building for municipal governments as it applies to promotion of effective local 
agricultural service delivery. The strength of decentralized service delivery is mainly in 
LGUs’ advantage in ascertaining demand and consequently tailor-fitting the supply of 
support services to local needs. Such “demand-side” advantage of these LGUs is 
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undermined as municipal governments in the highly rural areas coincidentally tend to 
have fewer resources for service provision. Where resources or service priority (as in the 
case of highly urban municipalities) are low, the role of the provincial government in the 
delivery of agricultural support is crucial to successes at the municipal level. 
1.7 Implications for Policy and Practice 
Results of the analyses suggest that agricultural support performance is 
significantly driven by the municipal government’s resources, fiscal management 
capacity, and its provincial government’s performance. This section explores a few 
policy and practice implications of these findings. 
Improvements in incomes provide municipal governments with greater flexibility 
to expand funding toward activities and projects that enhance its agricultural support 
performance. The impact of this variable is understandably small as incremental increases 
in the municipal resources are in turn allocated into various spending priorities, one of 
which is economic services. Since this expenditure category comprises only about 17 
percent of the municipal spending, agricultural services spending is expected to be less 
than this amount. The following essay shows that this share can be substantially lower.  
Adjustments in the computational formula for determining IRA transfers seem to 
be a straightforward response to the resource needs of devolved agricultural service 
delivery. The task is politically and technically daunting as the challenge lies in 
proposing an alternative scheme that accommodates other points of disparities among 
localities. The LGC already has in place a provision that requires municipal governments 
to allocate 20 percent of their annual spending to local development activities. Still, this 
requirement does not necessarily get channeled toward agricultural services delivery.  If 
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municipal agricultural support is to  be boosted with infusion of resources into the LGU, 
a targeted grant is a viable alternative to merely relying on IRA increases.  
Increasing locally generated incomes can also aid the resource requirements of 
improved agricultural support performance. Unfortunately, most of the lower income and 
more rural municipalities were also observed to depend heavily on IRAs. The issue points 
to the need to boost the fiscal management capacity of these LGUs so they can improve 
their incomes with gradually decreasing dependence on IRAs. This enables greater 
flexibility to make allocations that enhance the local economic base which, in the case of 
rural municipalities  implies greater allocations toward agricultural support. 
Municipal governments have also been adopting alternative provision schemes 
such as partnerships and coordination with various sectors in society. For example, Van 
den Ban and Samanta (2006) observe from Asian countries the growing trend of 
extension delivery conducted under pluralistic institutional arrangements, that is, with 
significant involvement of farmer groups, non-government organizations (NGOs), and 
the private sector.  As found results of the analyses imply, maintaining close partnership 
with the provincial government is important to performance. The provision of services 
that the municipal government could otherwise not afford through its limited resources 
can otherwise be provided through partnership and coordination with the larger 
provincial government. Furthermore, the municipal government can look into 
strengthening its linkage with national government agencies, which offer the needed 
capacity and technical support for local agricultural service delivery.  
Results suggest that for highly rural municipalities that are encumbered by 
relatively greater resource and capacity limitations, agricultural service delivery 
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performance is contingent on the corresponding performance of the provincial 
government. Strengthening the provincial government’s capacity to provide support to 
the agricultural sector is hence expedient to the promotion of effective municipal 
agricultural service delivery, particularly for highly rural municipalities. However, 
inasmuch as provincial governments have the benefit of greater organizational size and 
capacity, municipal governments are deemed better able to gain knowledge of local 
demands (Azfar, Gurgur, Kahkonen, Lanyi and Meagher, 2000) than the higher-tiered 
LGU. Building agricultural service delivery capacity of highly rural municipalities should 
therefore be an ultimate goal if the comparative advantage of these LGUs in being more 
aware of local preferences can be exploited for improved agricultural service delivery. 
1.8 Caveats and Future Work 
A few notes of clarification and future research implications are in order. First, 
this study has largely focused on rural clientele share as an approximation of agricultural 
service demand. The application of this concept as an objective measure of local service 
demand encountered issues with regard to impact attribution. For one, rural constituency 
share appears to be intertwined with other variables that also affect performance, such as 
IRA dependence and municipal income. Alternative measures of local service demand 
that do not have the baggage of being correlated with other determinants of performance 
will be explored in a follow-up study. Municipal-level survey of farming households that 
directly identify local service needs from the rural constituency is a possible 
measurement strategy. Such an effort can be resource-intensive but nevertheless a 
promising alternative for research that is focused on local government responsiveness to 
service demands. 
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Secondly, local government performance analyzed in this study is anchored to the 
measurement applied by the LGPMS. These municipal performance scores are 
aggregated ratings from categorical self-assessments of LGUs based on several criteria 
(see Appendix B). Aggregated scores however do not provide information about 
particular service area strengths that differentiate one municipal government’s 
performance from another. Analysis of service delivery performance in terms of these 
criteria of performance will be the subject of a later inquiry.  
Thirdly, this study recognizes that inclusion of a few other variables would have 
contributed significant insights into municipal performance. Political determinants were 
not included in this study mainly due to limitations in time to consolidate nationwide 
information about voting statistics and mayoral incumbency, which could have been 
examined as determinant of the variations across the municipalities. Additionally, 
consideration of lagged effects of income and provincial performance could shed light 
into possible endogeneity issues.  
The patterns of municipal government performance also appeal to benchmarking, 
both for excellent performers and the poor performers. Such inquiry could shed light into 
the municipal characteristics that are associated with excellent agricultural service 
delivery---traits that could benefit the less-performing LGUs. At the same time, a closer 
look into the poorly performing municipalities can aid the understanding of 
organizational and other support interventions that may be lacking.  Assuming that the 
LGPMS assessments become more institutionalized into the local government system, 
movements across performance levels over time can also be valuable inputs to dynamic 
benchmarking efforts. 
 
 
CHAPTER 2: LOCAL FACTORS AND NEIGHBOR EFFECTS                                                
ON AGRICULTURAL SUPPORT SPENDING:                                                                         
THE CASE OF MUNICIPALITIES IN BOHOL, PHILIPPINES  
 
 
2.1 Introduction 
The fiscal decentralization reforms that came along with devolution under the 
1991 Local Government Code have essentially given municipal government greater 
autonomy in determining the allocation of its own spending. Given expanded income-
generation powers and Internal Revenue Allotments (IRAs), these local government units 
(LGUs) also have the authority to manage public resources toward the pursuit of 
development goals that they deem as the locality’s main concern. All such reforms 
correspond to the argument that decentralization gives way to more locally responsive 
service delivery (Oates, 1993; Wallis & Oates, 1988). In the countryside where 
agriculture remains as a major sector in the municipalities, spending toward extension 
and research activities, that is agricultural service delivery, is arguably the most relevant 
among the expenditure allocation choices that municipal governments make. A municipal 
government’s fiscal allocation for the administrative structure and local activities aimed 
at agricultural service delivery indicate the extent of its commitment to the devolved role 
of providing support to the sector. Notwithstanding the expansion of the IRA, these 
supplementary resource transfers from the central government were perceived 
incommensurate to the additional responsibilities LGUs have to carry (Brilliantes, 1998; 
Cuaresma & Ilago, 1996). With a tight budget constraint and the many competing local  
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needs faced by municipal governments, agricultural support expenditures all the more 
become more meaningful reflections of their thrust in promoting rural development. It 
should not be surprising if agricultural expenditures do not comprise a major chunk of the 
municipal fiscal allocations.  Even in the case of Bolivia, agricultural spending is a low 
priority vis-à-vis other basic needs served by the local government (Faguet, 2004). As 
noted above, the pie must be divided into various devolved services and in some cases 
certain public goods like social welfare or health services might have to take larger slices. 
The previous essay suggests this tendency as it reveals that the share of spending for 
economic services, which is inclusive of support services to the agricultural sector, 
averaged only about 17 percent of municipalities’ over-all expenditures. In the absence of 
a detailed breakdown of economic services expenditures, agricultural support spending 
would likely make up less of that proportion on account of competing economic sectors 
in the locality.  Such approximation of agricultural spending in terms of the bundled 
value of economic services expenditure may be an overstretch but it is also arguably the 
most expedient, given the structure of data used.   
The scholarship on local government fiscal behavior in the Philippines has been 
typically limited to the use of information from broad fiscal spending categories (Capuno, 
et al., 2012; Manasan, 2009; World Bank & ADB, 2005; Loehr & Manasan, 1999; 
Manasan, 1997). Without discounting the interpretive value of broad expenditure 
categories such as general, social and economic services spending, such structure of fiscal 
data provides little information about specific devolved responsibilities that matter more 
to one locality than another. Fiscal behavior toward local agricultural support receives 
very little attention in the scholarship despite the sector being significant source of 
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livelihood in the countryside. Clearly, economic services spending needs to be further 
broken down to indicate sector-specific allocations in order to explore this overlooked 
fiscal allocation item. This study addresses such concern by looking into local 
government spending directed at agricultural service delivery. Focusing on the province 
of Bohol for the breakdown of municipal expenditures toward agricultural support, it 
investigates the influence of neighbor-effects on municipal agricultural support spending, 
along with local factors.  
This study draws from several strands of public policy and administration 
research as it looks into the determinants of local public spending for agricultural support. 
Policy process studies that model policy actions offer some illumination to fiscal 
expenditure as a governance choice (Keiser & Meier, 1996; May,1992; Schneider & 
Ingram, 1993; Ostrom, 2007). At the same time, there is a wealth of research on local 
public spending that tackle the influence of various factors such as organizational 
structure (Coate & Knight, 2009; Morgan & Watson, 1995;Jung, 2006; Sass,1991), 
political factors (Gerber& Hopkins, 2011; Veiga & Veiga, 2004; Foucault, Madies, & 
Paty, 2008), interrelatedness of fiscal choices (Case, Hines & Rosen,1993; Frère, 
Leprince & Paty,2012), and the external influence of higher-level government units 
(Aronsson, Lundberg & Wikström, 2000; Turnbull & Djoundourian , 1993; Gerber& 
Hopkins, 2011). The underlying theories in these studies have yet to be extended to 
sector-specific fiscal allocations, particularly for local agricultural support spending. This 
study hence explores another aspect of devolved agricultural service delivery as it 
investigates the local and external determinants of municipal agricultural spending.  
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By investigating the factors influencing agricultural spending allocations at the 
municipal level, this study stands to contribute valuable insights that could help in the 
understanding and improvement of resource mobilization toward local agricultural sector 
support. It also eliminates attribution issues encountered in the preceding essay by 
isolating expenditure allocation for agricultural services and using this more direct 
measure as determinant of agricultural support performance. Its focus on the less 
researched agricultural component of local government spending is a distinct take on 
local fiscal behavior and one that befits the context of most municipalities in the 
Philippine countryside.  
2.2 Related Literature 
Agricultural support expenditure is considered here as simply a subset of the total 
municipal expenditure. Although the values for this variable can be exclusively 
interpreted for just one type of public good delivered by the LGU, it is nevertheless a 
fiscal spending choice. Understanding of municipal agricultural spending can hence 
benefit from the insights offered by theoretical reasoning and empirical evidence in the 
policy and administration literature.  
Since fiscal expenditure is in itself a type of governance action, the policy process 
scholarship imparts insights about public choice determinants that could be applied to 
municipal agricultural expenditure choice. For instance, Keiser and Meier (1996) explore 
the influence of resources, bureaucratic values, local variation in need for services, fiscal 
incentives, client characteristics and party competition on the levels of policy 
implementation. In policy design studies, the political environment and public officials’ 
perception of target populations are considered as shapers of policy agenda (May,1992; 
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Schneider & Ingram, 1993). The Institutional Analysis and Development (IAD) 
framework also enlightens research on this subject through its focus on the effect of 
choice rules and incentives on policy choice (Ostrom, 20007). Under the IAD framework, 
the Rational Choice Model (RCM) depicts policy decision makers as bounded rational 
individuals who make benefit-maximizing choices based on incentives and available 
information. RCM lays down the ground for the examination of a number of factors 
deemed to explain local government choice such as its expenditure levels and allocations 
for agricultural support. 
The body of research on public spending has looked into the various factors 
influencing local government expenditure. Comparative studies of American 
municipalities consider the influence of the local government’s structure on public 
spending levels (Coate & Knight, 2009; Morgan & Watson, 1995;Jung, 2006; Sass,1991). 
Coate and Knight (2009) provide evidence for the argument that public spending is lower 
under mayor-council than a council-manager form of government while Morgan and 
Watson (1995) find the influence of government structure to be small and showing 
likelihood of effectiveness in localities that have partisan ballots. The other two studies 
are particular in qualifying their results according to functional scope of the expenditure. 
Jung (2006) verifies that public spending significantly differs between mayor-council and 
council-manager forms of government at the two narrowest common municipal 
functions. Sass (1991) comes up with a similar result for municipal expenditures for 
schools when government structure is considered exogenous.  
Other studies on local public spending regard the influence on public spending of 
political factors like partisanship (Gerber& Hopkins, 2011) and opportunistic behavior of 
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local officials (Veiga & Veiga, 2004; Foucault, Madies, & Paty, 2008). Gerber & 
Hopkins (2011) find the party affiliation of the mayors affect public expenditure 
allocations for policy areas where local discretion is high. On the other hand, Veiga and 
Veiga (2007) ascertain how expenditures of Portuguese municipalities increase during 
pre-election periods, particularly for infrastructure expenditures which are most visible to 
voters. Foucault, Madies, & Paty (2008) confirm the same tendencies in French 
municipalities as spending for all categories increase in pre-electoral periods. 
Additionally, they delve into the effects of mayors’ party affiliations in the existence of 
expenditure interdependencies among local governments. 
Another strand of related research explores the external influence of other 
governments to the local government’s fiscal choices. The literature investigates 
interdependencies among neighboring local governments (Case, Hines & Rosen,1993; 
Frère, Leprince & Paty,2012) as well as between the local government and other 
government levels (Aronsson, Lundberg & Wikström, 2000; Turnbull & Djoundourian , 
1993; Gerber& Hopkins, 2011).  Case, Hines and Rosen (1993) explain this spending 
interdependency as a result of efficiency-optimizing adjustments to a neighboring 
municipality’s activities. They argue that, on account of spillovers, the expenditures of 
neighboring governments become an important determinant of state and local 
government expenditures. However, in the case of French municipalities, Frère,Leprince 
and Paty (2012) do not find significant impact of interdependencies within inter-
municipal cooperation arrangements. . On the other hand, Aronsson, Lundberg and 
Wikström (2000) validate the relation between regional and municipal government 
expenditures in Sweden, pointing to vertical interaction in the public sector. Turnbull and 
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Djoundourian (1993) find a complementary relationship between county and city general 
expenditures as public sector expansion effects at the county level are reinforced by 
greater municipal spending. 
As a relatively young democracy, the Philippines can also be expected to exhibit 
economic and political characteristics identified with other public spending determinants 
proposed in the literature. This study extends some of the existing fiscal spending 
theories to the municipalities in the study area. However, there are aspects of the 
Philippine context that limit and reinforce the applicability of some of the determinants in 
the above-mentioned studies. For instance, the uniform establishment of the mayor-
council governments across municipalities in the country renders the influence of 
organizational structure on spending levels irrelevant.  The mayor playing a central role 
in both administrative and policy decision making underpins the significance of his or her 
political incentives to expenditure levels and allocations of the municipal government. 
Finally, fiscal interdependence among neighboring local governments in the country has 
yet to be explored and a research effort to this end could provide insights that can guide 
possible coordination of fiscal planning among LGUs.  
The studies discussed above direct attention to the functional scope of the 
expenditure as a fundamental component of meaningful comparisons of municipal 
spending. In these studies, spending is analyzed in aggregate and in terms of major public 
expenditure categories such as general, school, public safety and infrastructure-related 
services. It has yet to be established whether the local demand and incentive factors have 
uniform patterns of influence across spending categories. Moreover, Case, Rosen and 
Hines (1993) note that the sign and magnitude of the impact of governmental 
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interdependence may differ for each spending category. The variety of services under the 
local government’s responsibility implies that the work ahead is substantial in volume if 
we are to meaningfully interpret how service-specific spending is determined.   
In the context of decentralized developing countries where agriculture continues 
to be a relevant sector, a study that focuses on local government spending for agricultural 
services delivery has yet to enter the discourse. The challenge of such focus rests in being 
able to access more detailed information about fiscal expenditures at the local 
government level.  In the Philippines, the structure of available data reported in central 
government agencies seem to explain why scholarship on local government fiscal 
behavior is usually limited to the analysis of broad expenditure categories like general, 
social and economic services at the local government levels, and service sector spending 
categories at aggregated levels (Capuno, et al., 2012; Manasan, 2009; World Bank & 
ADB, 2005; Loehr & Manasan, 1999; Manasan, 1997). As the recent transparency 
reforms are gradually establishing consistent posting of local government financial 
reports to government repositories and websites, researchers are gaining greater access to 
more detailed expenditure allocation information about the LGUs in the country. 
Inquiries focused on previously overlooked spending categories like agriculture support 
can now be pursued to shed light on fiscal behavior relevant to local rural development 
targets. This study initiates such effort with the objective of contributing to empirical 
gaps in local public spending literature and providing the unique case of Philippine 
municipal governments.  
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2.3 Hypotheses  
Be it at the national or local level, the public budget is a representation of a 
government’s policies for a fiscal year. As Anderson (2006) puts it, “The budget is not 
simply a financial statement; it is also a statement of policy” (p167). Monetary spending 
is necessary for the implementation of any policy. Since resources of the local 
government are limited, the decision making process that yields the municipal 
government’s public spending allocations is one in which choices are made over a large 
set of competing post-devolution local service needs.  This study views agricultural 
spending as a result of such a process. The decision model it proposes is focused on the 
mayor as the central actor, whose appreciation of local demand, municipal resource 
capacity, political incentives and inter-municipal dependencies ultimately leads to the 
municipal government’s expenditure toward agricultural support.  The following 
discussion depicts a combined economic and political process.  
Agricultural support may not be equally prioritized by local governments since 
some municipalities are more dependent on the agricultural sector than others. This 
variation in the level of support for the agricultural sector is argued as the municipal 
government’s response to the perceived local service demand, as approximated in terms 
if the relative size of the rural clientele. Although the preceding essay was not able to find 
support for the positive influence of rural clientele share on agricultural service delivery 
performance, this study proceeds to test whether the proportion of rural clientele 
positively affects the municipal government’s policy for local agricultural support in 
terms of its spending allocation.  
2.3.1 Municipalities with high proportions of rural constituents will 
spend more on agricultural support. 
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Current income is typically derived from a combination of forecasts of past 
incomes and anticipated additional monies from changes in IRA, local tax policies and 
other income-generating programs. It was observed in the preceding essay that on 
average, over 80 percent of the municipal incomes are actually comprised by IRA from 
the central government. This particular fiscal transfer practice in the Philippines 
somehow comes between competing views about the revenue-expenditure relationship 
tackled in the literature. Holtz-Eakin, Newey, and Rosen (1989) argue that local public 
expenditure is either simultaneously or inter-temporally influenced by locally-generated 
income or revenues. On the other hand, Dahlberg and Johansson (1998) challenge this 
argument and present empirical findings that claim the opposite direction of the 
relationship. In both studies, the influence of grants, which are the close equivalent of 
IRA from the central government, are evaluated separately. In this study, the 
overwhelming share of IRA in the municipal government’s total income diminishes the 
need to separately analyze locally generated revenues from it. Instead, focusing on the 
gross income is considered as the realistic approach to explaining expenditure allocation 
in the setting of Philippine municipalities. The municipal government’s income is simply 
assumed as a direct constraint to its expenditures while expenditures cannot be seen to 
directly affect future incomes, at least for now when a formula-based IRA accounts for 
much of the gross municipal income. Lower income levels force local officials to 
compress agriculture spending, along with (and probably in favor of some) other 
development priorities. Conversely, improvements in municipal incomes could ease 
pressures on local officials to put agriculture support to the back burner. This study tests 
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this positive influence of local government income on the municipal spending allocation 
for agriculture.  
2.3.2 Higher income municipalities will spend more on agricultural 
support 
 
In the Philippines, political disciplines are relatively in infancy and are 
continually being molded by dynamic changes in government behavior interacting with 
new flows of information brought about by decentralization reforms (Azfar, Gurgur & 
Meagher, 2004). The devolution shrunk the distance between providers and users of 
public goods. Constituents can more closely observe and attribute the performance of 
local officials who have become directly responsible for the delivery of devolved services 
in their jurisdictions. Such advantage in the access to information about local governance 
efforts further enhances the accountability of local officials to the citizenry who exercise 
their voice in the elections (Kaufmann, Mehrez & Gurgur, 2002). For the most part, it is 
the mayor, as local executive and deemed main policy actor in the municipality, who 
bears much of this accountability. Being cognizant of the power of the vote, incumbent 
party mayors exhibit opportunistic behavior by using expenditure decisions to signal a 
policy stance or governance effort to the citizens. Such behavior is captured in the 
political business model (Nordhaus, 1975) which first explained this behavior as response 
to “voter myopia” but later rationalized as a means of signaling competence to voters 
(Rogoff & Siebert, 1988). This model is later applied to research about local government 
spending in which expenditures were observed to increase during pre-election period, 
particularly for services most visible to voters (Veiga & Veiga, 2004; Foucault, Madies, 
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& Paty, 2008).  The analyses test this behavior, along with the effect of the voting rates in 
the municipality. 
2.3.3 Agricultural support spending will be higher in pre-election year 
 
2.3.4 Agricultural support spending when the voting rate in the 
municipality is higher. 
 
 
The influence of neighboring municipalities on fiscal expenditure allocations for 
agricultural support is also investigated in this study. While a host of explanations could 
justify relationship, such as learning, competition and cooperation, the inquiry primarily 
seeks to address the applicability of the fiscal interdependence thesis (Case, Rosen 
&Hines, 1993) to Philippine municipalities.  This neighbor-effect is premised on the 
assumption that spillovers exist across geographic borders. When benefits and costs of 
another municipality’s activities affect the welfare of citizens in the bordering 
jurisdiction, government officials in that neighboring community make efficiency-
optimizing adjustments that would ensure certain services are neither underprovided nor 
over provided to citizens. With regard to agricultural support, spill-overs between border-
sharing municipalities can be realized from complementary farm-to-market road and 
irrigation networks, joint development cluster activities, or even from farmer-to-farmer 
knowledge spill-overs from research and extension. This study tests whether the amount 
of municipal expenditures for agricultural services will fluctuate with the same 
allocations in neighboring municipalities.  
2.3.4 Higher agricultural support spending of neighboring municipalities 
will lead to lower municipal expenditure allocated to agricultural services. 
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2.4 Data and Methodology 
The hypotheses were tested using a balanced panel dataset profiling all the 
municipal governments in the island-province of Bohol from 2010 to 2012. The province 
was selected for this study for simplicity and convenience in analysis of neighbor effects 
in agricultural services spending because being geographically detached from other 
provinces limits similar spill-overs from municipalities in other provinces. Such could be 
a concern in testing the hypothesis on fiscal spending interdependence within the 
province. While it has a growing tourism industry, the province has primarily been 
agricultural, making the sector a priority in its development agenda. As in most parts of 
the country, rice is a major agricultural product in Bohol. 
Bohol is located in the central part of the Philippine archipelago with a land area 
of about1590 square miles, which is just a little larger than Rhode Island. Distributed into 
the province’s three congressional districts are 48 cities and municipalities, with all but 
three localities situated in the main island. Figure 2.1 is a representation of the province’s 
political boundaries. The city of Tagbilaran, seat of the provincial government and a local 
offices of central government agencies, has been classified as a completely urban area 
and hence excluded from the study. A three-year fiscal data was obtained from the 
database of the Bureau of Local Government Finance (BLGF) for all 47 of the remaining 
municipalities. This information was augmented with demographic information from the 
National Statistics Coordination Board (NSCB) website. The panel data set corresponds 
to a full election cycle that begins with 2010 as election year. 
 
 
 
65 
                
F
IG
U
R
E
 2
.1
: 
P
o
li
ti
ca
l 
m
ap
 o
f 
B
o
h
o
l 
m
u
n
ic
ip
al
it
ie
s,
 b
y
 c
o
n
g
re
ss
io
n
al
 d
is
tr
ic
t.
 
66 
 
2.4.1 The Dependent Variable 
Agricultural support expenditure is defined here as the amount in pesos of annual 
disbursed monies toward the purchase of goods and services for the conduct of normal 
operations of the municipal government solely for the conduct of agricultural service 
delivery. Such appropriations are mostly budgeted expenditures for the conduct of the 
municipal agricultural office’s (MAO) daily business. It covers payment for personnel 
services, maintenance and other operating expenses (MOOE), financial expenses, and 
capital outlay expenses of the MAO. Since larger constituencies require greater resources 
for provision of public goods than others, municipal spending is considered here on per 
capita basis to standardize comparison across municipalities of different population size. 
The corresponding variable in the primary model for agricultural services spending is 
derived by dividing total agricultural expenditures by the total rural population.  
2.4.2 Independent Variables 
2.4.2.1 Share of Rural Constituency 
As in the preceding essay, rural population share is considered as an 
approximation of local demand for agricultural service delivery. Rural population is 
defined as the number of people living outside urban areas--- people who are most likely 
dependent on the agricultural sector as main source of livelihood. Population figures 
sourced from the NSCB database are used to compute the share of the rural constituency, 
which is equivalent to the ratio of rural population to the total in each municipality. Given 
the modest fluctuations on population movements in the period covered, this variable is 
time-invariant. 
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2.4.2.2 Municipal Income 
Financial data are sourced from the consolidated statements of income and 
expenditure (SIE) for municipalities archived at the BLGF website. The municipal 
government’s income indicates the amount of funds available to the municipal 
government for allocation toward delivery of various services. It is inclusive of local 
incomes and IRA from the central government. As shown later, the heavy dependence of 
municipalities on IRA makes a separate look into impact of financial transfers redundant. 
Focusing on total municipal income as the measure of financial capacity to allocate 
spending toward agricultural services, this study divided it by the population and used the 
results as values for the income variable in the agricultural support spending model. 
2.4.2.3 Political Factors 
The cycle for local government elections in the Philippines is three years. In the 
period covered in this study, 2012 is pre-election year to the following cycle. Although 
earlier studies have argued positive influence of a pre-election year on public spending, 
gross public spending can also be expected to incrementally rise over time due to periodic 
movements in factor prices and service demands that grow with the population over time. 
Use of the per rural capita measure of agricultural support spending as dependent variable 
could address the influence of population growth. At the same time, specifying the robust 
standard errors to allow for intra-group correlation can control for estimation effects of 
periodic incremental expenditure increases for each municipality. Considering these 
adjustments, the effect of an election year is then tested through the inclusion of year 
dummies in which the pre-election year is designated as base year. With regard to testing 
the influence of voting rate on agricultural service spending, the ratio of the number of 
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actual voters over that of the total registered voters in the municipality is computed and 
added as explanatory variable. Values for this variable were taken from the 2007 and 
2010 election statistics. 
2.4.2.4 Neighbor’s Spending 
Complementarity of agricultural support spending is premised on neighboring 
municipalities sharing economic, demographic and ecosystem characteristics such that 
their rural development goals are comparable. Any spill-over effects of neighboring 
municipalities’ agricultural support activities should therefore matter to the municipal 
government that is making a spending allocation decision toward its own service 
delivery. The neighbor-effect on a municipality’s agricultural spending is derived as the 
mean of per rural capita expenditures toward agricultural support by all municipalities 
with which it shares a border. This study’s use of “common borders” as the criteria for 
defining neighbor-effects is the most simple and logical way of capturing spill-over 
effects between municipalities although there are admittedly other ways of defining 
“neighborliness” (Case, Rosen & Hines, 1993). In this measure, all neighbors are 
assumed to have equal influence on a municipality’s agricultural spending.  
Univariate global Moran’s I statistics were generated for municipal spending. to 
examine spatial autocorrelation across the province, which might be accounting for the 
neighbor effects. Just like a Pearson correlation coefficient, Moran’s I generally ranges 
between -1 and 1, with positive values indicating positive autocorrelation and vice versa 
(Kalkhan, 2011). The statistics and corresponding scatterplots were calculated through 
the use of the GeoDa software for geodata analysis (Anselin, 2003). 
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2.4.3. Model and Estimation Technique 
This study tests the hypotheses by estimating an empirical model for municipal 
agricultural support spending (AGEXPit) as influenced by the high rural constituency 
share (RURALit), financial capacity (INCOMit), political incentives (YEAR and 
VOTERTit), and the average spending of neighboring municipalities (NEIGHit). It also 
considers what is argued in the literature (Holtz-Eakin, 1986) as time-invariant and 
unobserved characteristics of the municipality that might affect spending allocations for 
local services. Some municipalities have a politically engaged constituency that is able to 
articulate demands for agricultural services in ways other than voting in the elections 
while some have a more passive citizenry. Furthermore, some communities tend to be 
more oriented to rural development agenda than others, even with comparable shares of 
rural constituency. In such scenarios, the time-invariant and unmeasured individual or 
municipal effect can influence agricultural support spending. Its effect on the standard 
error estimates is controlled for in the estimation of a fixed-effects (Equation 2.1) and a 
random-effects (Equation 2.2) model. 
          AGEXPit =  β0 + β1RURALit + β2INCOMit + β32010 + β42011 +  
                                   β5VOTEit + β6NEIGHit + αi + uit 
 
where  
αi is the unknown intercept for each municipality 
uit is the error term 
 
 
 
(2.1) 
          AGEXPit =  β0 + β1RURALit + β2INCOMit + β32010 + β42011 +  
                                   β5VOTEit + β6NEIGHit + uit + εit 
 
where  
uit is the between-entity error 
εit is the within-entity error 
 
(2.2) 
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There are contradicting views about the incremental nature of governmental 
budgets.  In the sixties, a group of scholars have observed how government budget is 
predicted by the previous year’s budget (Wildavsky, 1964; Davis, Dempster & 
Wildavsky, 1966; Sharkansky, 1968). Other scholars have however challenged the 
strength of incrementalism’s effect in budgeting (McCubbins & Schwartz, 1984; Berry & 
Berry, 1990). For Philippine municipalities, the standard report form for the municipal 
government’s programmed appropriation and obligation in the current year includes 
reference to past year figures (See Appendix E for reference). Such practice does not 
necessarily imply that current expenditure allocations of Boholano municipal 
governments are predicted by previous expenditures; rather, it shows that the effect of 
previous budgets on current ones cannot be completely ignored in the proposed spending 
model. Although serial correlation may be more of a concern for panels with long time 
series, cluster-robust standard errors were specified in the estimations in order to produce 
“correct” standard errors despite the presence of correlations among the reported yearly 
agricultural spending for each municipality (Angrist & Pischke, 2009). By assigning the 
municipal ID as the clustering variable, the estimations basically relax the assumption of 
independent observations within each municipality but maintain the same assumption 
across municipalities. This specification also produces standard estimates that are robust 
to disturbances being heteroskedastic.  
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2.5 Results 
Bohol has one component city and 47 municipalities. The analyses were applied 
to all Bohol LGUs, with exception of the city of Tagbilaran which was reported to be the 
only completely urban locality in the province. Observations for each municipality 
covered the each of the three panel periods, making for a balanced panel data set. 
 
2.5 1 Trend and Distribution of Agricultural Service Spending 
The summary of agricultural spending variables in Table 2.1 shows that the 
average annual spending for agricultural services in the period covered is PhP 1.72 
million. This amount comprises about 3.42 percent of the total municipal spending, way 
smaller compared to the 17 percent average share of economic services spending across 
municipalities in the province. These budget allocations for agricultural spending 
average PhP96 per rural constituent.  
TABLE 2.1: Agricultural services spending in Bohol, 2010-2012 .
Variable 2010 2011 2012 2010-2012
Gross agricultural support spending (PhPmilion)
Mean 1.58 1.78 1.79 1.72
Standard deviation 1.11 1.23 1.39 1.24
Minimum 0.48 0.31 0.40 0.31
Maximum 6.84 7.52 8.74 8.74
Agricultural support spending share (%)
Mean 3.36 3.54 3.35 3.42
Standard deviation 1.49 1.54 1.34 1.45
Minimum 0.73 0.70 1.00 0.70
Maximum 8.07 8.55 9.01 9.01
Agricultural support spending per capita (PhP)
Mean 91.43 100.21 96.83 96.16
Standard deviation 66.95 70.66 64.24 66.95
Minimum 14.07 24.20 21.37 14.07
Maximum 449.53 465.33 420.18 465.33
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The measure of gross agricultural expenditure by rural clientele unit enables 
comparison across municipalities with varied sizes of target beneficiary population. 
Figure 2.2 illustrates the average trend for per rural capita agricultural spending across 
the province. It can be noted from the map that majority of the municipalities belong to 
the three lowest quintiles, in which spending values fall below the province-wide 
average. 
 
FIGURE 2.2: Thematic map of average agricultural services spending 
in municipalities of Bohol, 2010-2012. 
 
Figure 2.3 illustrates the trend for average per rural capita agricultural spending 
from 2010 to 2012, relative to per capita income, gross expenditures, and economic 
services spending. The figure highlights the comparatively very low amount of 
agricultural spending. Considering that agriculture is a major economic sector in these 
municipalities, it is remarkable how unit spending for agricultural support is merely one-  
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fourth of the average economic services spending per individual.  The amount is  
dwarfed when other spending priorities like general, education and other public services 
items are jointly considered in the total per capita public expenditure. The estimations 
conducted later in this study look into local factors and neighbor-effects that might 
explain this level of agricultural expenditure allocation.  
The breakdown of municipal agricultural spending in Table 2.2 indicates that 
much of the resources expended by the municipal government toward the delivery of 
support to the agricultural sector mostly involve the upkeep of daily operations of the 
municipal agriculture office (MAO). About 70 percent of the agricultural spending is 
made up of expenses for payment of employee salaries and wages, benefits and other 
compensation. The manpower at the MAO is made up of administrative and extension 
workers, some of whom were assigned from the central government offices during the 
devolution. In addition to organizing consultation meetings and other projects for 
farmer-constituents, the extension staffs perform coordination duties with counterparts 
in the provincial and other municipal governments. Where implemented, they are also  
assigned to monitor nurseries and other on-site research projects of the MAO. 
Maintenance and other operating expenses (MOOE) for the purchase of supplies, travel 
and communication expenses, repair and maintenance, and other goods and services 
comprise about 27 percent. From interviews with MAO staff in Bohol, the MOOE mostly 
covered the upkeep of the office and its coordination activities. With regard to providing 
farmers access to farming inputs, the MAO has largely been responsible for the 
coordination of subsidies from higher tiers of the government as well as in facilitating 
purchase through consignment arrangements with private suppliers. Next to capital outlay 
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expenditures, expenses for specific project activities such as demo farms, quality control 
and irrigation make up the rest. Appendix E is a sample budget appropriation form 
reporting expenditure allocations for each fiscal year. It includes a more detailed list of 
line items under each major spending category indicated in Table 2.2. 
 
TABLE 2.2: Breakdown of average municipal agricultural expenditures. 
Line Item
(Php 
million) (%)
(Php 
million) (%)
(Php 
million) (%)
Personnel Services 1.001   70    1.131   70    1.145   71    
MOOE 0.521   26    0.622   28    0.562   27    
Debt Servicing -      -   -      -   -      -   
Capital Outlay 0.055   3      0.027   2      0.052   1      
Project Activities 0.089   1      0.292   1      0.339   1      
     Extension & research -      -   -      -   -      -   
     Demonstration/farm nurseries 0.002   0      0.008   0      0.009   0      
     Operation of farm equipment pool -      -   -      -   -      -   
     Quality control of agri products 0.001   0      0.003   0      -      -   
     Irrigation System 0.002   0      0.001   0      0.006   0      
Total Expenditures on                  
Agricultural Services 1.577   100  1.780   100  1.759   100  
Source: BLGF
2010 2011 2012
 
 
2.5.2 Measures of the Explanatory Variables 
About three-fourths of the municipalities in Bohol belong to the two lowest 
income classes (Table 2.3). The average municipal income is about PhP59million, a little 
under half of the mean for the municipalities in the country (Table 2.4). About 62 percent 
of the municipalities fall below this average (Figure 2.4). Among the richest 
municipalities are Carmen, Talibon and Ubay.  
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TABLE 2.3: Distribution of municipalities by income class. 
No. Percent
First-class municipality 3 6
Second-class municipality 2 4
Third-class municipality 6 13
Fourth-class municipality 24 50
Fifth--class municipality 12 25
Third-class component city 1 2
Total 48 100
Frequency
Classification
 
 
 
 
TABLE 2.4: Municipal incomes. 
Variable 2010 2011 2012
Income (PhPmillion)
Mean 55.88     60.28     59.96     
Standard deviation 20.49     21.92     24.98     
Minimum 27.60     25.26     28.11     
Maximum 109.08   123.82   140.62   
 
 
 
 
 
FIGURE 2.4: Frequency distribution of incomes (PhPmillion), 2010-2012. 
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FIGURE 2.5: Rural and urban populations of Bohol municipalities, 2010-2012. 
 
Rural constituents make up a substantial share of the population in most Boholano 
municipalities. As can be observed in Figure 2.5, all except Bien Unido and Dauis have 
majority rural populations. The average share of rural population is about 83 percent, 
with approximately 64 percent of the municipalities exhibiting higher proportions. About 
one-third of the municipalities have at least 90 percent rural population. Figure 2.6 
reflects this distribution.  Furthermore, given the short length of the panel, rural 
population shares have not changed over time. 
Voting rates are generally high across the country. In Bohol, the average of 
proportion of voters who actually casted votes in the previous local elections is 84 
percent and ranges from 67 to 89 percent. The distribution of this variable is presented 
in Table 2.5. 
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FIGURE 2.6: Frequency distribution of % rural constituency, 2010-2012. 
 
 
TABLE 2.5: Voting rates (%) by election year. 
Variable 2007 2010 Mean
Mean 82.84     84.41     83.63     
Standard deviation 3.66       3.13       3.48       
Minimum 67.34     70.72     67.34     
Maximum 87.57     88.55     88.55     
N 47          47          94          
 
 
 
 The computed averages of agricultural expenditures for municipalities sharing a 
border with each subject are presented in Table 2.6. These figures are comparable to the 
agricultural expenditures reported in Table 2.1. Since this variable was used in the model 
estimations, spatial autocorrelation was examined for agricultural spending (per rural 
capita) across the province. Moran’s I statistic was computed for clusters of four, six, 
eight and ten nearest neighbors in order to detect interrelatedness in agricultural spending 
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beyond the extent of “neighborliness” strictly defined in the proposed model as shared 
borders. Results of the spatial analyses are summarized in Table 2.7. The Moran’s I 
values are generally close to zero,  indicating weak spatial autocorrelation in agricultural 
spending among the municipalities. Figure 2.7 illustrates the patterns of spatial 
autocorrelation for three-year agricultural services spending averages. It can be noted that 
regardless of the assumed number of nearest municipal neighbors, the standard deviations 
of the variable are .generally clustered around the central axis. The slopes of the 
regression lines are equivalent to the Moran’s I values in Table 2.7 and as earlier noted, 
rather small. Moreover, the calculated reference distribution for spatially random layouts 
with the same values as observed (Figure 2.8) did not show the Moran I statistic to be 
significant. Since spatial analyses did not yield statistically significant spatial 
autocorrelation, this study proceeds to use of its proposed neighbor-effect measure. 
 
TABLE 2.6: Neighbors’ spending for agricultural services.
Variable 2010 2011 2012
Gross agricultural support spending (PhPmilion)
Mean 1.67 1.95 2.01
Standard deviation 0.68 0.83 1.03
Minimum 0.58 0.91 0.86
Maximum 4.13 4.57 5.32
Agricultural support spending per rural capita (PhP)
Mean 89.61 100.38 98.20
Standard deviation 26.75 25.51 25.61
Minimum 32.70 42.59 41.42
Maximum 153.63 167.63 171.82
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TABLE 2.7: Univariate Moran’s I for agricultural services spending                                         
in Bohol, 2010-2012. 
K-Nearest Neighbors 2010 2011 2012 2010-2012
k=4 0.0941 0.0243 0.0223 0.0574
k=6 0.0024 -0.0455 -0.0396 -0.0252
k=8 0.0150 -0.0369 -0.0392 -0.0165
k=10 -0.0244 -0.0657 -0.0596 -0.0490  
 
 
 
 
 
FIGURE 2.8: Reference distribution of Moran’s I for average agricultural services 
spending (k=4 nearest neighbors). 
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2.5.3 Estimation Results 
Results of the fixed-effects and random-effects regressions are summarized in 
Table 2.8. Both estimation models used municipal ID as group variable and a total of 141 
observations for 47 groups representing each of the municipalities in the province. Fixed 
effects regression was first done to control for time-invariant variables that might be 
correlated with the explanatory variables. Aside from rural constituency share and other 
time-invariant municipal characteristics, unobserved or unmeasured characteristics that 
are uniquely attributed to each municipality such as leadership capacity and local 
agricultural sector climate are also controlled for by fixed-effects regression. These 
factors can shape whether agricultural spending is seen as fiscal management strategy or 
a governance tool for local economic development. In the case of rural constituency 
share, the values are practically constant over the period of three years and are hence 
automatically omitted as a predictor variable from this estimation. Its effect, along with 
other time-invariant variables, is incorporated into the intercept. 
The fitted fixed-effects model was significant at one percent alpha. The estimates 
have provided support only for significant influence of neighbor-effects on the 
municipality’s agricultural services spending. In particular, every peso increase in the 
average per rural capita agricultural support expenditures of a municipality’s immediate 
geographic neighbors leads to a 67-cent average decrease in the municipality’s own 
spending, at one percent level of significance. On the other hand, random-effects 
regression was applied to account for omitted variables that are random and uncorrelated 
with the explanatory variables. Since the Hausman test in Table 2.9 revealed that the 
coefficients estimated by the efficient random effects estimator are the same as the ones 
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estimated by the consistent fixed effects estimator, this study proceeded with the use of 
the random-effects model. Random-effects regression has allowed the inclusion of the 
time-invariant variable—rural constituency share— in the model as a predictor variable.  
TABLE 2.8:  Panel estimates for agricultural services spending per capita (n=141). 
Independent Variables Coefficient
Robust 
se Coefficient
Robust 
se
Rural population share (%) (omitted) -2.54 1.33
Income per capita (PhP) 0.01 0.01 0.02 *** 0.01
Percent actual voters 0.33 1.74 0.47 1.41
Year Dummy
     2010 -10.13 5.37 -6.09 4.59
     2011 3.81 4.47 1.54 4.50
Neighbors' agricultural spending -0.67 *** 0.18 -0.30 ** 0.14
Constant 110.12 141.73 237.40 150.65
F(5,46) 3.84 ***
Wald chi2(6) 29.51 ***
sigma_u 65.95 45.55
sigma_e 21.83 21.83
rho 0.90 0.81
Note: ***p < 0.01
             **  p < 0.05 
Fixed Effects Random Effects (GLS)
 
 
TABLE 2.9:  Hausman test results. 
Fixed Random
Independent Variables (b) (B) (b-B)
Income per capita (PhP) 0.01 0.02 -0.01
Percent actual voters 0.33 0.77 -0.44
Year Dummy
     2010 -10.13 -7.68 -2.45
     2011 3.81 2.77 1.04
Neighbors' agricultural 
spending -0.67 -0.50 -0.17
chi2(5) 3.10
Prob>chi2 0.6852
0.70
0.10
Diff s.e.
Coefficients
sqrt(diag(V_b-V_B))
0.01
0.75
1.79
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The random-effects estimates have an R
2
 of 0.1076 for predicting the within 
model and 0.4344 for the between model. If these estimates were used to fit the overall 
data, the R
2
 is 0.4082. Joint significance for all slope coefficients was confirmed by the 
Wald statistic (29.51) which was significant at one percent alpha. The resulting GLS 
estimates for the random-effects model provide support for the hypothesized role of 
municipal income and neighbor-effects on a municipal government’s spending toward 
agricultural services. The model shows that at one percent level of significance, every 
peso increase in the per capita municipal income across the years brings about an average 
increase of two centavos in per rural capita spending for agricultural services. The 
magnitude of the effect is modest, reflecting the relatively weak place of agricultural 
service delivery in resource allocation priorities of the municipal government. Going 
back to Table 2.1, agricultural services spending makes up about three percent of the 
municipal spending while the entire economic spending category (in which agricultural 
spending is included) takes up 17 percent of the total expenditures.  
With regard to neighbor-effects, every peso increase in neighboring 
municipalities’ mean agricultural services spending (per rural capita) leads to an average 
decrease in the municipality’s own spending by 30 centavos, at 5 percent level of 
significance. This result suggests significant extent of spill-over effects from across 
municipal borders such that when the level of agricultural support activities and spending 
are higher for the neighbors, the level of the municipal government’s own provision is 
lower. The Breusch and Pagan Lagrangian multiplier (LM) test for random effects 
confirmed significant differences across municipalities. About 81 percent of the variance 
is due to differences across panels. 
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The influence of rural constituency share on municipal agricultural service 
spending was not found to be statistically significant at 5 percent alpha; it was however 
negative and significant at 10 percent. These analyses of the data from Bohol 
municipalities do not provide sufficient support to the assertion that municipal 
governments are responsive to local service needs—at least not when service needs are 
considered in terms of the proportion of the rural clientele in the local population. If we 
extend interpretation of the results to consider the marginal statistical significance of this 
variable, the influence is even contrary to expectations. 
Finally, none of the political factors were found to have significant effect on 
agricultural support spending. Higher voting rates did not significantly improve 
agricultural services spending. Moreover, the pre-election year (2012) did not exhibit 
significantly higher spending per rural capita. Going back to Table 2.1, it can be noted 
that the average per rural capita agricultural spending for 2012 was even slightly lower 
than for the previous year.  
2.6 Discussion and Conclusion 
It was obvious early in the analyses that on average, agricultural support has not 
been a spending priority for municipalities in the study. Following Anderson’s (2008) 
reasoning, such is the apparent local policy with regard to agricultural service delivery. It 
would not be surprising to find this observation extend to the rest of the municipalities in 
the country if the economic services spending patterns were the basis. Parallel to the 
nationwide trend cited in the preceding essay, economic services spending in Bohol 
comprise about 17 percent of the total municipal expenditures. The meager three percent 
share of agricultural support spending in Boholano municipalities is a reflection of the 
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many competing responsibilities that these LGUs have to fund through the limited 
resources it has for disposal. Estimates of the random effects model for agricultural 
support spending however provide much helpful insights into such spending level. 
One of the remarkable findings from the analyses is the lack of statistically 
significant influence of rural constituency share on the municipal government’s spending 
for agricultural support (Hypothesis 2.3.1). Revisiting the argument that decentralization 
gives way to more locally responsive service delivery (Oates, 1993; Wallis & Oates, 
1988), results suggest that this does not necessarily translate into the movement of 
agricultural support spending toward the same direction as the share of the rural 
constituency to whom this service matters. It invites reconsideration of the original intent 
for which the variable was selected--- to signal local demand for agricultural support.  
As noted in the preceding essay, rural constituency share is an indirect 
approximation of local demand for agricultural support and does not provide as much 
detail about citizen preferences for public services as surveys do. However, citizen 
surveys also come with some hitches. For one, surveys can be time-consuming and costly 
as the scope of coverage broadens. Secondly, many surveys are criticized for design 
flaws that fail to control tendencies of citizen-respondents to overstate preferences for 
public service (Miller & Miller, 1991).  Since the principle of measuring local service 
needs through aggregate demographic data has been done in other public scenarios 
(Simonsen, 1994; Ladd & Murray, 2001), rural constituency share is still arguably a 
conceptually acceptable technique for ascertaining local agricultural support needs. The 
challenge is in differentiating its impact from those of local government performance 
determinants that are closely associated with rural communities such as income. 
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Owing to the scope of this study being limited to just 47 municipalities over a 
short period and the skewness of the rural constituency share toward high values, 
variation in the values for this variable is very limited, which in turn affects the estimates 
of its influence on agricultural support spending. Such relationship can be revisited 
through a wider geographical scope and/or a longer panel. Furthermore, the lack of 
relationship may be due to budgeting and service co-provision arrangements that weaken 
any link between perceivable demand from constituency share and agricultural support 
spending. For one, the breakdown of spending detailed in Table 3 indicates that much of 
the financial resources are devoted to administrative upkeep and coordination functions 
of the MAO, which are not necessarily elastic to the relative size of the clientele 
population. The amount of funds left after paying for personnel services and MOOE is 
allocated to project activities, which, given very limited resources, only comprises one 
percent of the total agricultural support spending. Moreover, anecdotal accounts of MAO 
staff indicate that the expenses for other forms of agricultural support coursed through the 
municipal government are funded by either the provincial government or central 
government agencies. While these concerns may hamper analysis of demand-
responsiveness, the municipal government’s agricultural spending nevertheless reflects 
the extent of its commitment to the mandate of devolved agricultural service delivery and 
hence warrants inquiry into its other determinants. 
The modest positive influence of income on agricultural services spending 
confirms the second hypothesis. Put simply, increasing the size of the proverbial pie 
increases public spending for agricultural support, even if it receives only a very small 
slice. This income effect may likewise be seen as effect of the volume of central 
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government transfers since IRA generally makes up much of the municipal incomes in 
the province.  
 The coefficients for voting rate and the year dummies were not found to 
significantly affect agricultural support spending. However, this result does not 
necessarily dismiss the importance of local citizens’ political voice in local fiscal 
decisions altogether. Instead, the failure to accept the corresponding hypothesis (2.3.3) 
point to the summative nature of the citizen’s vote as an assessment mechanism of the 
incumbent LGU leadership’s performance. Considering that agricultural support is only 
one of the many devolved services in the charge of the municipal government, efforts of 
locally elected officials to signal performance are more meaningfully appreciable in 
aggregate spending than in sector specific allocations, even in places where the 
agriculture is considered as the most important economic sector. 
The major message that can be drawn from the results is that municipal 
agricultural spending is as much a locally influenced decision as it is shaped by allocation 
choices outside its borders. Agricultural spending allocations of adjacent municipal 
governments significantly influence a municipal government’s own fiscal choices. As 
argued in the literature, awareness of the activities of one’s immediate municipal 
neighbors inform the LGU about the spill-over of benefits across jurisdictional 
boundaries for which it does not need to financially provide. Greater autonomy from 
decentralization reforms has therefore not limited municipal governments’ policy 
decision making within their boundaries. As presented in this study, expenditure 
interdependence characterizes municipal agricultural support delivery in Boholano 
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municipalities, and perhaps in the rest of the Philippines. Such extension however calls 
for a broader scope of study 
2.7 Implications for Policy and Practice 
Spending indicates the extent of the municipal government’s commitment to 
agricultural sector support. It can be noted from the case of the municipalities in Bohol 
that agricultural services delivery are at the lower level of local government’s spending 
priorities. The agricultural services spending behavior modeled here offers valuable 
insights that can guide efforts to boost the delivery of these devolved services either 
through fiscal budgeting changes or alternative measures. 
As the analyses revealed, municipal income plays a significant role in boosting 
fund allocations toward agricultural services. Considering that IRA funds most of the 
municipal governments’ budget, the effect of income on agricultural support spending 
has a couple of implications for the allocation of the IRA transfers. First, the IRA 
allocation scheme could be reviewed for adjustments in gross receipts for the LGU. This 
review can also be done to explore ways of directly channeling or assigning these 
transfers toward agricultural support provision. The Local Government Code (LGC) 
currentlyt stipulates appropriation of no less than twenty percent (20%) of the IRA 
toward local development plans. However, the projects for which these funds can be 
expended do not strictly have to address the local needs in the agricultural sector. These 
funds usually go to priority infrastructure projects that the mayor and the municipal 
council deem as most relevant to the locality. In light of finding that rural clientele share 
and election-related incentives do not significantly move local budget policies toward 
favoring agricultural services spending, it seems that bringing agricultural support to the 
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budgeting agenda of local officials requires a less passive trigger. In this case, 
stakeholders have an imperative task of actively lobbying for the allocation of IRAs, local 
development appropriations, and other public resources toward support for the 
agricultural sector. 
One way municipal governments get around financial constraints is by 
establishing partnership with other government units and the private sector in the 
provision of agricultural services in their localities. The full costs of such arrangements 
are not fully borne by the municipal government. In many cases, the municipal 
government only bears the costs of coordinating service provision. For example, some of 
the MAOs in Bohol enter into consignment arrangements with seed and fertilizer 
producers to provide local farmers access to these farming inputs. The expenses incurred 
from such activities are imputed to the MOOE as part of the regular operations of the 
MAO. In such cases, agricultural spending does not fully reflect the value of certain 
service activities that the LGU co-provided with other entities. 
Neighbor-effects on agricultural support spending indicate spill-over of benefits 
across municipal boundaries. On one hand, awareness of the spill-over benefits of a 
neighbor’s agricultural spending can be seen as an incentive for the municipality to free-
ride and under-provide for the local agricultural sector. On the other hand, this points to 
an opportunity to promote efficient use of resources within a cluster of neighboring 
municipalities. Awareness of benefit spillovers can motivate inter-municipal 
partnerships for the provision of agricultural services. Creation of such ties will need 
institutional prodding from the provincial government, central government agencies and 
other government partners. One case of such partnership is the Bohol Integrated Area 
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Development Cluster V (BIAD V). BIAD V is composed of eight municipalities in the 
inland area of the Bohol that have coordinated efforts to promote the production of 
organic rice in the area. Existing arrangements like that of BIAD V can be reinforced 
with capacity building support.  
2.8 Caveats and Future Work  
The geographic and analytic scope of this inquiry limits the extent to which 
findings can be generalized. For one, this study’s focus on Boholano municipalities 
enables it to define neighborliness in terms of shared borders because most of the island-
province is part of a contiguous landmass. While this definition of a neighbor seems 
appropriate in considering service benefit spillovers between adjacent localities in the 
province such as sharing of knowledge from extension services between farmers living 
on either side of a municipal border or the access benefit of a constructed or reinforced 
farm-to-market road, it does not apply to geographically disjointed municipalities, and is 
too simplistic to accommodate benefit spillovers between municipalities from different 
provinces as is the case in the larger islands. For an archipelago such as the Philippines, 
the neighbor concept used here will not be applicable to other areas in the country. 
Moreover, this approach ignores service benefit spillovers beyond the adjoining borders. 
In such case, neighbor effects may become underestimated. The spatial autocorrelation 
analysis executed here introduces alternative ways that the concept of neighbor-effects 
can be analyzed for in agricultural services spending. The technique was not only useful 
in verifying for random patterns of spending across the province; it also demonstrated 
the utility of “nearest-neighbor” weighting, which could be applicable to an expansion 
of inquiry beyond Bohol. This will be subject of a future inquiry.   
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This study recognizes that inclusion of a few other variables would have 
contributed significant insights into municipal performance. Although political 
determinants were included in the analyses, the inclusion of mayoral incumbency and 
tenure history could also inform about the influence of other aspects of political 
motivation that drive variations in agricultural services spending across the 
municipalities. Additionally, consideration of lagged effects of income and neighbor 
spending could shed light into possible endogeneity issues. 
Finally, the applicability of the spending behavior modeled in this study can be 
explored for expenditure patterns in alternative public services that have been devolved 
to local governments.  
 
CHAPTER 3: THE INFLUENCE OF NETWORK EMBEDDEDNESS ON 
ATTITUDES TOWARD ORGANIC FARMING PROMOTION:                                                  
A STUDY OF MAYORS IN BOHOL, PHILIPPINES 
 
 
3.1  Introduction 
Owing to decentralization reforms that came with the 1990 Local Government 
Code (LGC), local governments in the Philippines have been exercising greater direct 
authority over the delivery of devolved public services in their localities. The devolution 
counted on local government units (LGUs) to effectively assess local conditions and 
directly respond through a more autonomous system of governance. However, local 
determinants only partly explain policy choices of these subnational governments. As 
argued in the research on state policy innovation in the US, external influences also 
matter to policy adoption through the process of policy transfer. To date however, the 
extent to which policy transfer influences policies in the Philippine local governance 
system has yet to be explored. 
One of the recent policies for consideration of LGUs is the local adoption and 
implementation of Republic Act 10068, otherwise known as the “Organic Agriculture 
Act of 2010” (OAA). As the OAA defines organic agriculture according to ecological, 
social, economic and technical standards, promotion of this technology involves 
discouraging the use of chemical fertilizers, pesticides and other synthetic inputs in lieu 
of the practice of soil fertility management, varietal breeding and selection under 
chemical and pesticide-free conditions, and the use of ecologically sound biotechnology 
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and other cultural practices, among other things. Such ideas are still relatively new to 
farmers who, with much credit to the “Green Revolution” campaigns in the seventies, 
have long been oriented to high-yielding farming technologies that used synthetic 
fertilizer and pesticides. LGUs considering organic farming promotion that is aligned 
with the OAA face a new policy that entails a substantial shift from a productivity-
focused farming technology to one that places greater emphasis on sustainability. 
Declaring the national government’s commitment to the practice of organic 
agriculture, the OAA calls for the development and dissemination of organic farming 
technology through the National Organic Agricultural Program (NOAP) and the 
formation of local technical committees (LTCs) at the provincial and municipal levels for 
the implementation of NOAP. Creation of LTCs indicates a decisive move of LGUs to 
align themselves with this new national policy agenda and thus the inclusion of organic 
technology into the local government’s menu of agricultural services.  Like most of their 
counterparts in the rest of the country, municipalities in Bohol have yet to signify formal 
commitments to the OAA through local policies that promote organic farming in their 
respective jurisdictions. At the time of the study, official reports show that only about 20 
percent of municipalities in the country and none of the municipalities in the study area 
of Bohol have formed LTCs in accordance with OAA guidelines (DA, 2012). Consistent 
with this account, none of the municipalities in Bohol have passed a local ordinance to 
formally align with RA10068 or launched a full campaign that promotes organic farming.  
Local initiatives to promote the technology are few and more exploratory in character. 
Despite the seeming sluggishness of OAA’s progress in the LGUs, the presence of 
relevant discourse and tentative local moves to promote organic farming in Bohol suggest 
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that the local policy process has already commenced. A few observations suggest 
mounting relevance of organic farming promotion in the awareness of LGU officials in 
Bohol. For instance, the provincial government has already initiated discourse about the 
promotion of organic farming across Bohol (Chatto, 2011). A welcome progress can be 
seen in the on-going effort of Bohol Integrated Area Development (BIAD) V, an 
economic cluster of rice producing municipalities, to position themselves in the organic 
rice market (LGSP-LED, 2013). Furthermore, from 2009 to 2010, several municipalities 
have reported embarking on activities that involve use of organic technology such as 
government-run vermiculture composting projects and promotion of backyard vegetable 
farming (LGPMS, 2013). 
At this relatively early stage in the dissemination of OAA for local government 
take-up, the appropriate issue concerns how local officials’ attitudes toward the 
prospective policy are being shaped by on-going policy transfer processes. Understanding 
“attitude” as a psychological tendency to favor or disfavor an entity (Eagly & Chaiken, 
1998), this study defines policy attitude as the outlook or the degree of receptiveness 
toward a policy. It is determined from expressions of perceptions about the policy’s 
benefits. In the same way that attitudes are considered crucial to the success of 
innovations in information systems (Rice & Aydin, 1991 citing Lucas), the attitudes of 
key officials also have some bearing on the successful adoption and implementation of 
policy innovations. With their authorities strengthened by the decentralization reforms in 
the past two decades, mayors are the most influential public official in Philippine 
municipalities.  The mayor provides executive leadership over the daily affairs of the 
LGU and exerts much influence in the work of the local legislative council through 
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powers of veto, agenda-setting and persuasion. Such leadership style, dubbed as the 
“command and control” model (DAP, 2005), makes a mayor’s’ policy attitude essential 
to the successful adoption and implementation of local policy innovations.   
This study probes the role of mayors as agents of ideas along with the network 
mechanisms that enable them to communicate policy information across municipal 
boundaries. The attention given here to the embeddedness of the mayor in social 
networks is premised on this LGU official’s critical role as agent of ideas for policy 
making. After all, mayors are both users and sources of information about local policy 
issues. This agency role for policy ideas is one of the elements included in Campbell’s 
(2002) proposed approach to unraveling causal processes between ideas and policy 
outcomes. The networks of a mayor’s interactions with other mayors serve as channels 
through which relevant information about policy is exchanged, thereby embodying 
another component of Campbell’s approach--- the mechanisms that enable 
communication of policy ideas. This study applies the network perspective in its 
investigation of how mayors’ policy attitudes of toward the promotion of organic farming 
may be socially influenced through social network exchanges. It employs social network 
analysis (SNA) to characterize each mayor’s embeddedness in their provincial network. It 
proceeds to determine the influence of different measures of embeddedness on the 
incidence and extent of similarities between a mayor’s policy attitudes and those of his 
fellow mayors, both in the entire network and in the network of his immediate ties--- his 
ego network.  
This study highlights the value of tapping social networks of mayors for the 
dissemination of national government initiatives, which in this case is the accelerated 
95 
 
LGU take-up of the OAA. Moreover, it implements a unique take to the research on 
policy transfer in terms of at several aspects. First, unlike the usual focus on policy 
actions as objects communication and learning mechanisms, it concentrates on the 
attitudes of mayors as targets of socially influenced policy learning. Policy attitudes are 
less obvious than policy actions but being able to explain how the former is influenced by 
transfer mechanisms provides insight into how the latter ultimately evolves through the 
process. Consideration of policy attitudes hence contributes to the understanding of the 
less noticed but just as relevant intermediate outcomes of the policy transfer process. 
Secondly, this study highlights the value of social influence in the process of policy 
transfer as it adopts the network approach to characterize the social system of mayors, 
and associates network embeddedness traits of these officials to similarities in their 
policy attitudes. Such focus on social influence makes it one of the first local policy 
process studies to adapt the social information processing theory much used in 
organizational innovation research (Salancik & Pfeffer, 1978; Rice & Aydin, 1991). 
Furthermore, this study collected social network information that accommodates 
measurement of a wider range of embeddedness characteristics. In the measurement of 
network prominence, it used the mayors’ own assessments of “strong ties” and positive 
regard for peers that were derived directly through a survey. It was also able to 
characterize structural hole traits of mayors’ ego networks that are relevant to the 
information exchange and policy attitude similarities. Finally, this study provides a 
decentralized developing country perspective to the inquiry on policy transfer processes. 
Earlier works on policy transfer are criticized for tendencies toward pluralist assumptions 
(Dolowitz & Marsh, 1996). Such assumptions do not always apply to subnational 
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governments in countries like the Philippines, despite them having gone through 
decentralization reforms due to differences in political structures and institutional 
settings. Benson and Jordan (2011) note that empirical bias toward industrialized country 
settings has hindered deeper understanding of the structural factors to the process. 
The next section, which reviews related works on policy transfer, social learning 
and the network approach, is followed by the presentation of the theory and hypotheses 
of this study. Operationalization of attitudes and embeddedness measures are then 
described with the analytical design. The final sections discuss results of the analyses, 
final thoughts on the implications for policy and direction of future research. 
3.2 Related Literature 
Although policy transfer does not always lead to exact emulation, it embodies 
how policy goals, content, instruments, programs, institutions, ideologies, ideas and 
attitudes, and even negative lessons in one polity become external inputs to the 
formulation of policies in another (Dolowitz & Marsh, 1996; 2000). The breadth of 
studies that have already been devoted to policy transfer has expanded over time and the 
research continues to evolve and open up more opportunities for extended inquiries and 
empirical contexts (Benson & Jordan, 2011). This study performs one such extension. 
The body of research covering domestic and transnational policy transfer and 
diffusion has grown very much in the past half century (Graham, Shipan & Volden, 
2008). Policy diffusion, which generally refers to policy adoption patterns arising from 
communication or transfer processes between polities, has been applied in numerous 
policy innovation studies on the US federal system (Walker, 1969; Gray, 1973; Grupp & 
Richards, 1975; Berry & Berry, 1990; Balla, 2001; Volden, 2006, among others) as well 
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as in domestic contexts of other countries (Ito, 2001; Sugiyama, 2008; Shi, 2012). The 
field of international relations has also utilized the framework of policy diffusion 
(Dobbin, Simmons & Garrett, 2007; Cao & Prakash, 2010).  In the studies cited here, 
policy transfer is depicted as one of the main determinants of diffusion, with some citing 
personal interactions between key government officials as channels of emulation 
(Walker, 1969; Gray, 1973; Grupp & Richards, 1975; Balla, 2001). However, these 
diffusion studies do not elaborate on the social mechanisms behind the policy transfer 
process involved (Mintrom, 1997; Mintrom & Vegari, 1998).   
Policy transfer studies particularly cover the exchange and processing of 
information about policies in one setting for policy making in another setting (Dolowitz 
& Marsh, 1996). Policy transfer often happens through voluntary emulation due to 
learning and in some cases, leadership emulation (Grupp & Richards, 1975). This strand 
of research is closely related to the study of policy diffusion in terms of how it highlights 
the relevance of interdependencies between neighboring political systems.  In explaining 
policy transfer among British local authorities in terms of their individual embeddedness 
in the intergovernmental community, Wolman and Page (2002) note the influence of 
neighbors on a jurisdiction’s policy making.  These neighbor-effects are incorporated in 
organizational institutional theory which cites coercive, normative and mimetic pressures 
as determinants of isomorphic patterns in organizations (DiMaggio & Powell, 1983). 
Policy transfer however departs from policy diffusion as it focuses less on the 
transmission of a policy in its entirety and more on the transfer of information that shape 
individual policy actions (Dolowitz & Marsh, 2000). It has typically been investigated 
cross-nationally and even includes a wider array of actor-agents in supranational 
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organizations and transnational government levels (Dolowitz, 2003; Jones & Newburn, 
2006; Kwon, 2009; Stone, 2012, among others).  
In Benson and Jordan’s (2011) recent survey of literature on policy transfer, they 
note how research has evolved to encompass different perspectives and foci. Not only 
have inquiries ventured into more specific aspects of policy transfer mechanism like roles 
of policy actors, motivations and contents, but more recent works (as with Knill, 2005) 
have also used the concept of policy transfer to explain convergence of policies.  Benson 
and Jordan also cite opportunities to merge the concept of policy transfer with various 
theoretical concepts in the scholarship. This study is one likely prospect as it combines 
the concept of policy transfer with network-facilitated social learning to explain 
similarities in policymakers’ attitudes. Given its narrow focus, very little work has so far 
been done to directly address this study’s object of inquiry.  A few samples of related 
those research are discussed henceforth. 
With regard to explaining interdependent attitudes, the research on information 
systems adoption has investigated the impact of a few related factors.  Some studies 
consider the effect of one’s perception of others’ attitudes on actual attitude toward an 
innovation (Svenning, 1982; Steinfield, Jin & Ku, 1987). Others explore how shared 
culture and norms could explain the similarities of one’s attitude with those of the others 
in the organization (Nosek, 1989; Davis, Bagozzi & Warshaw, 1989).  Rice and Aydin 
(1991) bring in the network perspective in explaining attitude interdependence within an 
organization. As they apply the social information processing theory (Salancik & Pfeffer, 
1978), they focus on network-based mechanisms, arguing that an individuals' attitude 
toward an information system is influenced by the attitudes of one’s most frequent 
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contacts. Their work demonstrates the utility of the network approach in explicating the 
mechanisms and sources of socially influenced learning in the context of organizations.   
Studies on information systems adoption, along with other samples from 
innovation research (Inkpen & Tsang, 2005; Ahuja, 2000; Powell, Koput & Smith-Doerr, 
1996) substantiate the gaining popularity of the social network approach in explaining 
interdependent attitudes in different organizational settings. The approach also seems to 
be particularly useful to studies about policy innovation via transfer processes since 
social networks can serve as conduits of policy learning between neighboring 
jurisdictions (Wellman, 1983; Rogers, 2003; Adam & Kriesi, 2007). Several studies have 
applied the concepts of embeddedness and social capital to competitive advantage (Uzzi, 
1996; Moran, 2005; Schalk, Torenvlied, & Allen, 2010). Particularly for some studies on 
performance and knowledge transfer, focus given to the relevance of tie strength within 
networks (Granovetter, 1973; 1982; Burt 1992; Krackhardt, 1992; Hansen, 1999). 
In his examination of the relationship between the structural embeddedness of 
mayors and policy isomorphism in Danish municipalities, Villadsen (2011) provided 
support for the influence of social learning and networks on policy choices within the 
community of subnational governments. Villadsen argues the role social networks as 
conduit of information, expectations and pressures, which in turn guide policy choices 
making up policy convergence patterns. His application of the social network approach 
provides a very useful and interesting addition to the understanding of policy innovations. 
However, his results are limited to explaining only formal interactions based on mayors’ 
memberships of different organizations, committees and boards. While organization-
based activities provide mayors with opportunities to discuss work-related issues and 
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governance strategies, solely focusing on those types of ties would tend to ignore the less 
formal means of communication and social learning. In the socio-cultural context of the 
Philippines, informal or personal ties are just as significant as formal ties in fostering 
information transfer among officials; sometimes, the lines are blurred by pre-existing and 
evolved kinship.  Additionally, the work of Villadsen is limited to explaining 
convergence patterns for discrete policy choices. Its findings can therefore only speak to 
the social mechanisms of policy learning that actually lead to adoption of policies. Given 
the choice of dependent variable, network effects on policy learning that did not 
culminate to discrete policy choices are ignored in the analyses. 
This study sets out to extend the empirical context of the research on local policy 
transfer, not just to the Philippine municipal government setting, but also in the 
application of a wider set of embeddedness concepts in its application of the network 
approach. Through the use of survey method in gathering information about mayors’ 
relations, it was able to derive more specific types of ties such as “strong ties” based on 
each mayor’s self-reports of most frequent interactions, as well as directional ties of 
positive regard based on reports about the most respected mayor-peer. With such 
alternative operationalization of network ties, the use of different measures of 
prominence, and the incorporation of structural hole traits in the analyses, more aspects 
of embeddedness than has been in previous works are examined here. Moreover, this 
study observes policy transfer through a cognitive measure of policy attitude, a more 
direct result of policy transfer facilitated through socially networked communication 
mechanisms though a less popular object of inquiry.   
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3.3 Hypotheses 
The social information processing model posits that the social environment is an 
important source of information and normative cues for forming individual attitudes 
(Salancik & Pfeffer, 1978). Along the same line, this study generally argues that social 
relations have a significant bearing on local policy learning and transfer processes such 
that embeddedness in the social network can influence the incidence and extent of 
similarities between a mayor’s policy attitudes and that of his mayor-peers in the 
province. Be it due to coercive, normative and mimetic pressures or lesson-drawing 
(DiMaggio & Powell, 1983; Rose, 1993), policy attitudes among interacting local 
officials are expected to become more alike. Researches on policy diffusion (as reviewed 
Berry & Berry, 2007) and a more recent study on policy isomorphism (Villadsen, 2011) 
refer to such dynamics in explaining adoption behavior arising from socially mediated 
influences from other jurisdictions.  
Most valuable in elucidating the mechanism of social influence on policy attitudes 
is the social network perspective. Formal and informal mayoral ties make up a social 
network in which knowledge, beliefs, values and norms are exchanged between mayors 
through (Pfeffer & Leblebici, 1973). In this study, attention is directed at the traits that 
characterize a mayor’s embeddedness in social networks. Embeddedness has been largely 
applied to how economic behavior is influenced by social relations (Granovetter, 1985) 
although later on, the concept became popular in organizational research as determinant 
of exchanges and performance (Borgatti, 2003). In the simplest sense, embeddedness 
refers to an actor’s position in a social network brought about by repeated interactions 
with other actors. It is generally argued here that embeddedness of mayors in the social 
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network affects how policy-related information are transferred and processed by these 
LGU officials. Such influence eventually manifests in the incidence and extent of 
similarity between a mayor’s attitude and the collective attitudes of his fellow mayors in 
the broader network as well as in their respective ego networks. This argument is tested 
in terms of the two groups of embeddedness measures: a mayor’s network prominence in 
the broad network and the structural holes in a mayor’s ego network. 
Prominence refers to one’s visibility to other actors in the network and is 
differentiated into centrality and prestige (Knoke & Burt, 1983; Wasserman & Faust 
1994). Centrality is an actor’s degree of involvement with other actors in the network 
regardless of whether or not he is an initiator or receiver of that relation. On the other 
hand, prestige is the degree to which one is at the receiving end of positive social 
relations. The first four hypotheses tested here distinguish the influence of these two 
concepts of mayor prominence in the social network. 
Centrality indicates a position of advantage since connection to more people gives 
an individual more opportunities for gainful exchange. It also determines the one’s access 
to information as well as the speed by which information can be accessed. Being more 
central in the network also connotes greater opportunities to transmit information to other 
actors. One of the hypotheses that this study tests is whether mayors who have more 
relational ties in the network are expected to be so exposed to and involved in greater 
traffic of information that their attitudes with regard to the new policy become more 
similar to those of other mayors in the network. 
3.3.1 The policy attitude of a more centrally positioned mayor will more 
likely become similar to those of the other mayors in the network. 
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3.3.2 The policy attitude gap between a more centrally positioned mayor 
and other mayors in the network will be smaller.  
 
 
Four different measures of centrality were applied in the analyses. Among these, 
degree centrality has the advantage of simple of computation and interpretation as it 
pertains to the number of an actor’s direct interactions with other network actors 
(Borgatti & Halgin, 2010). By this measure, the central actors are those who have access 
to the most information channels. On the other hand, closeness centrality indicates how 
much an individual is far away from the others in the network. By this measure, the 
importance of the mayor’s central position in the network is with regard to how 
communication could be done with as little reliance upon intermediaries as possible. 
Closeness centrality is however only meaningful for connected graphs because single 
nodes in unconnected graphs register infinite distances from other nodes in the network. 
Alternatively, betweenness centrality approximates centrality even for unconnected 
graphs. This measure indicates a mayor’s role in controlling or mediating relations 
between other non-adjacent mayors in the network. It is the “extent to which other actors 
lie on the shortest path between two actors in the network” (Knoke &Yang, 2008, p67). It 
reveals an actor’s interpersonal influence (Freeman, 1979; Friedkin, 1991), control over 
communication and resources (Knoke & Yang, 2008), and gate-keeping roles 
(Wasserman & Faust, 1994). Finally, the Bonacich centrality is a modification of degree 
centrality and considered superior (Hanneman & Riddle, 2005). It is basically determined 
by the number of an actor’s connections as well as the number of connections of those 
with whom he is connected. It takes into account both positive and negative exchange 
systems. It is usually equated with power in positive exchange systems where having 
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well-connected neighbors improves an actor’s access to information as well as ability to 
transmit the same. In exchanges however, the same idea of centrality leads to a less 
advantageous position. Connection to well-connected neighbors means dealing with 
actors who have access to many alternative exchanges, thereby reducing one’s bargaining 
power. In this study, the influence of Bonacich centrality is tested particularly for 
information exchanges. Hence, the influences of this centrality measure, along with those 
of the other three measures of centrality, are expected to be congruent with the above-
stated hypotheses. 
Prestige in the network of mayors connotes the favorability of the mayor’s 
position as an object of attention and deference. This measure is closely related to the 
concept of power, which is inherently relational and a consequence of relationships 
(Hanneman & Riddle, 2005).  It provides an actor with opportunities to exert social 
influence on fellow actors in the network. In market exchanges, prestige is used as signal 
of quality and thereby guides investment and exchange decisions when information about 
the market is imperfect (Podolny, 1993). An actor who enjoys a status of prestige can be 
an object of emulation and a trusted conduit of ideas by peers. This study therefore tests 
whether prestige enables mayors to be more effective senders and conduits of information 
such that they exhibit policy attitudes closer to that of other mayors in the network. 
3.3.3 The policy attitude of a mayor who has a status of prestige in the 
network will more likely be similar to those of the other mayors. 
 
3.3.4 For a mayor who has a status of prestige in the network, his policy 
attitude gap from the other mayors will be smaller. 
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A mayor’s ties in the network determine the social capital available to him. Social 
capital is a resource emanating from relationships between actors which they can use to 
pursue individual goals (Baker, 1990). It is seen as a form of advantage that usually leads 
to economic gains when strategically applied (Burt, 2000). Interacting actors are 
perceived to share the ownership of social capital in the sense that benefit from any 
connection is contingent on the willingness of the other party to stay in that relationship 
(Burt, 1992). Joint ownership of a relationship however does not automatically mean that 
both parties have equal levels of social capital. Between two interacting actors, the 
difference in the amounts of their respective social capital can also depend on the extent 
of reciprocity in the relation. In this study, I specify a mayor’s social capital as the 
advantage of access to information that would draw his policy attitudes closer to those of 
other mayors. 
Social capital is usually associated with the strength of ties, which based on the 
frequency of interactions. Strong ties, which indicate the most frequent and closest 
relations, are expected to exhibit greater cohesion with between actors as a result of 
repeated interactions. On the other hand, weak ties have been associated with bridging 
roles to crucial information in the network (Granovetter, 1973). Burt (1992) qualifies the 
observation of the bridging role of weak ties and proposes the agency of structural holes 
to explain the conditions responsible for information benefits from bridges between 
subgroups within a network. Burt defines structural holes as the absence of ties or a 
relationship of nonredundancy between an actor’s contacts, yielding additive rather than 
overlapping benefits. He argues that the individual who has ties (strong or weak) that 
reach over structural holes is at a greater advantage than other actors in his subgroup 
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when it comes to obtaining information from other clusters or subgroups of actors in the 
network. On the other hand, the fewer structural holes or the prevalence of redundant ties 
within a subgroup could also be perceived to generate shared social capital. Redundant 
ties enable multiple access to information flowing within the subgroup, which eventually 
leads to shared knowledge and attitudes.  This study investigates such influences of 
structural holes in mayoral ego networks on a mayor’s advantage in accessing 
information as manifested in policy attitude similarities of a mayor with those of other 
mayors in the entire network as well as within the ego network. 
With regard to obtaining access to information beyond one’s subgroup, a mayor’s 
social capital is derived from having more structural holes within his ego network. 
Having non-redundant ties the ego network enhances a mayor’s exposure to information 
exchanges in the broader network. These ties can serve as bridges to information from 
other mayor clusters or subgroups in the broader network. Lower redundancy in a 
mayor’s ego network also means that this LGU official is not constrained to the 
information flow within the subgroup. Structural hole traits of a mayor’s ego network that 
indicate these social capital gains are thus expected to improve policy attitude similarities 
of the mayor with those of other mayors in the entire network.  
3.3.5 The policy attitude of a mayor whose ego network has more 
structural holes will have greater odds of becoming similar to the 
attitudes of other mayors in the entire network. 
 
3.3.6 For a mayor whose ego network has more structural holes, the gap 
of his policy attitude from those of the other mayors in the entire 
network will be smaller. 
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With regard to enhanced access to information within one’s subgroup, a mayor’s 
social capital is derived from having fewer structural holes within his ego network. Fewer 
structural holes imply that the mayor has more connections who are themselves 
interacting with each other. Social capital is higher in such an ego network where 
redundant ties give way to uninterrupted flow of information as there are more alternative 
means of access to one contact (Burt, 2001). When one’s contacts share ties with each 
other, it can become difficult to completely eliminate a mayor’s connection to a particular 
contact even if his direct ties to that individual were cut off. Redundancy becomes a 
constraining property as more of the same set of information flows in. Other forms of 
social capital that can be associated with this kind of ego network are the improved levels 
of trust, norms, reciprocity and other values, which serve both the information and 
material exchanges among the actors (Putnam, 1995; Coleman, 1988; Granovetter, 1985).    
As this study tests, fewer structural holes in a mayor’s ego network will result in greater 
similarity in policy attitudes between mayor and his immediate contacts. 
3.3.7 The policy attitude of a mayor whose ego network is characterized 
by fewer structural holes will have greater odds of becoming 
similar to the policy attitudes of other mayors in his ego network.  
 
3.3.8 For a mayor whose ego network is characterized by a fewer 
structural holes, the gap of his policy attitude from those of the 
other mayors in his ego network will be smaller. 
 
 
3.4 Methodology 
The hypotheses were tested using cross-sectional data provided by Boholano 
mayors who participated in the social network and perception survey in 2012. Initially, 
survey instruments were sent out to mayors in all 47 municipalities in Bohol. These were 
followed by visits to the municipalities which yielded a total of 24 completed interviews. 
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In the survey, respondents provided demographic and professional information, as well as 
self-assessments of their social interactions with fellow mayors in the province. They also 
shared their perceptions about the benefits of organic farming and its promotion in their 
localities.  The survey data was augmented with information from the provincial and 
national government websites.  
3.4.1 Dependent Variables: Policy Attitude Similarities and Gaps 
Policy attitude is defined here as the level of a mayor’s receptiveness toward the 
prospective local policy of organic farming promotion. It is denoted in terms of five 
major categories, which were constructed from the aggregation of the twelve perception 
statements about organic farming in the survey. Statements about perceived benefits of 
organic farming were aggregated into three main categories: environmental and health 
benefits, economic or income benefits, and combined environmental, health and income 
benefits of the technology. Statements pertaining to perceived municipal government’s 
motivations for adoption of the policy were reported under the aggregated category for 
political motivations. Finally, an over-all measure of policy attitude toward the promotion 
of organic farming was created.  
Measures of policy attitudes were drawn from the Likert-scale responses of the 
respondents indicating their levels of agreement to the twelve statements in the survey.  
The mayors were asked to express their responses on seven-point grades representing 
Strongly Disagree, Disagree, Somewhat Disagree, Undecided, Somewhat Agree, Agree 
and Strongly Agree.  After finding little variation in the intermediate response grades and 
for ease of interpretation, the original scale was condensed to a five-point scale in which 
Somewhat Disagree responses were combined with Disagree responses while Somewhat 
109 
 
Agree responses were joined with the Agree responses. To quantify mayors’ policy 
attitudes, corresponding response scores for survey statements aggregated under each 
category were averaged. The over-all policy receptiveness score is hence the mean of the 
response scores in all twelve survey statements. 
A binary variable was created to indicate similarities in each policy attitude 
category. Mayors whose policy attitudes fell into the same category as the average of 
their peers were assigned a value of “1” for similarity and “0” otherwise. Different sets of 
values for this variable was determined for entire network and ego network similarities. 
In each of the five categories, a mayor’s policy attitude score was then compared 
to the average of attitude score of his peers in the entire network as well as those in his 
ego network. From these comparisons, the absolute values of policy attitude gaps 
between a mayor (i) and with his peers (j) were derived through the formula in Equation 
3.1. Both the similarity and gap variables were estimated in the subsequent analyses. 
Policy Attitude Gap (i) = Attitude(i) – [ 
 
   
∑         ( )     (3.1) 
 
3.4.2 Independent Variables: Mayor’s Centrality Measures 
In the network map that was drawn from the survey data, each tie exists if either 
party names it as one of his most frequent interactions. Such information is based on 
mayors’ responses to the question asking them to name a maximum of three other mayors 
with whom they most frequently interact. Given the phrasing of the question, the 
relations identified by each respondent are his strong ties. The use of fixed number of 
choices in social network surveys is criticized for the risk of introducing measurement 
errors in the analysis of some network properties of subgroups (Wasserman& Faust, 
110 
 
1994). However, this study makes an exception for two reasons: 1) letting respondents 
name more than one mayor-cohort provides for existence of equally frequent relations, 
and; 2) limiting the responses to a maximum of three compels the respondent to make an 
effort to first assess their ties and identify the most relevant cohorts of all the mayors in 
the province. As to whether a response limit greater than three would have excluded 
some relevant ties, this did not turn out to be a concern in the survey since only one of the 
respondents named three ties. Four measures of centrality were derived from these self-
assessed reports of interactions: degree, closeness, betweenness and Bonacich.  
3.4.2.1 Degree Centrality 
Wasserman and Faust (1994) first define degree-centrality index, C_D(i), in the 
form of Equation 3.2 . 
C_D(i) = deg(i) 
deg(i) = xi+ = ∑      = ∑      
(3.2) 
 
In Equation 4.2, degree centrality for actor “i” is determined by the sum of direct 
ties with all other actors. Centrality score is computed by adding up cell entries in either 
row or column of actor i’s symmetric data matrix. To account for the effect of group size 
(g) on this measure, Wasserman and Faust subsequently propose the standardized 
version, C’_D(i), in the form of Equation 3.3. The formula divides the degree centrality 
score by the maximum number of possible connections with other actors in the network 
(   ) and  is interpreted as the proportion of actors (except “i”) adjacent to actor “i” to 
the total number of other actors in the entire network. This standardized measure of 
degree centrality is used in this study. 
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C’_D(i)  = 
    ( )
   
 (3.3) 
 
3.4.2.2 Closeness Centrality 
The simplest way of measuring closeness centrality is through the index 
developed by Sabidussi (1966). As shown in Equation 3.4, the index is equivalent to the 
inverse of the total distance ( (   )) to all other actors in the network.  A standardized 
version for ease of comparison between networks of different sizes was subsequently 
proposed and is presented in Equation 3.5 (Wasserman & Faust, 1994 citing 
Beauchamp). This measure can also be viewed as the inverse of the average distance 
between actor i and the other actors. Ucinet uses the term, average reversed distance 
(ARD) to refer to this closeness centrality measure.  
C_C(i) = [ ∑  (   )
 
   ]
-1 
 
(3.4) 
C’_C(i) = (g-1) [ ∑  (   )
 
   ]
-1
 (3.5) 
 
3.4.2.3 Betweenness Centrality 
Freeman (1977) first proposed the formula in Equation 3.6 for the computation of 
this centrality measure, which is the sum of the ratios of the shortest paths or geodesics 
between actors j and k containing actor i to the total number of geodesics between actors j 
and k. Standardizing this measure by the maximum value of 
(   )(   )
 
  yields the 
formula in Equation 3.7.  
C_B(i)  = ∑j<k 
   ( )
   
 (3.6) 
C’_B(i)  = 
 _ ( )
 
(   )(   )
 
 
 (3.7) 
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3.4.2.4 Bonacich Centrality 
In an earlier specification (Equation 3.8), Bonacich centrality (ei) is equated with 
the sum of all connections to other actors in the network (Rij) weighted by the centralities 
of those other actors (ej) (Bonacich, 1972).  Bonacich (1987) later proposes a more 
flexible formula (Equation 3.9) to accommodate the different forms of relations. In the 
recent specification, he introduces a parameter, β, to account for the degree and direction 
of dependence between actors.  
λei = ∑j Rij ej (3.8) 
Ci(α β) = ∑j (α + βcj) Rij (3.9) 
 
 In Equation 3.9, α is used as a determinant of vector length while β is used to 
represent the extent to which the centralities of other actors determine an actor’s status in 
the network. The sign of β is contingent on the type of relations being studied. A positive 
value is assigned to β in information exchange networks because the higher status of 
one’s neighbors improves his access to information. A negative value is applied in 
bargaining relations when exchange with the actor is precluded by the higher statuses of 
his neighbors who have access to more alternative deals. The magnitude of β, which 
ranges from zero to one, indicates the extent to which centralities of an actor’s neighbors 
could be taken into account. Increasing value of β indicates greater consideration of 
neighbor centralities, which is essentially the effect of indirect ties along with direct ties 
to an actor’s centrality in the network. This study assumes a positive β value since it is 
more focused on the dynamics of information exchange. A magnitude of β equivalent to 
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0.44 is used here based on the recommended value equivalent to 0.5% less than the 
maximum possible weight.  
 
3.4.3 Independent Variables: Mayor’s Prestige Score and Status 
Based on the definition in Wasserman and Faust (1994), prestige score is simply 
the sum of indegrees for an actor (Equation 3.10). The formula shows that principle of 
measuring prominence in terms of prestige score is only differentiated from that of 
degree centrality score by its application to directed ties. To account for the effect of 
network size, prestige is similarly standardized by the maximum number of possible 
connections with other actors in the network (Equation 3.11). 
P(i) = deg(i) =     
where deg(i) is the indegree of actor i 
(3.10) 
P’(i) = 
     
   
 (3.11) 
 
Using information drawn from responses to the survey question, “Is there a 
municipal mayor in the province whose opinion you value most in terms of policy and 
program implementation decisions?”, prestige scores were computed based on the 
standardized formula in Equation 3.11. Only about half of the respondents were 
nominated and there was very little variation in the computed prestige scores of those 
who were named as such.  While the scores were useful in preliminary comparisons of 
the mayors’ prominence in the network, it appears that the best way to test the influence 
of prestige on policy attitude gaps and similarities is by operationalizing it as a status. 
Prestige status is hence defined as a binary valued variable representing a position that 
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enjoys any level of positive regard from other mayors in the network.  This variable is 
assigned a value of “1” if a mayor has a non-zero prestige score and “0” if otherwise. 
  
3.4.4 Independent Variables: Structural Hole Traits of Mayors’ Ego Networks 
The structural hole traits of the surveyed mayors’ ego networks that were 
measured in this study are those considered to indicate the type of social capital 
applicable to the two levels of attitude comparison: 1) similarity with other mayors in the 
broader network and 2) similarity with mayors in the ego network. These measures 
mainly characterize the extent of a mayor’s redundant connections and constraining ties. 
The first group of traits depicts the extent of connections in a mayor’s ego network: 
redundancy, effective network size and efficiency. The second set includes the measures 
of constraint and hierarchy. These traits and the methods used in their measurement are 
described in the following subsections. 
 
3.4.4.1 Redundancy 
Based on Burt’s (1992) definition, redundancy for an actor i’s ego network is 
through Equation 3.12.  
Redundancy (i) = ∑ (      )                   q ≠ i  j (3.12) 
 
In the formula, the extent to which actor i’s contacts are redundant with other 
contacts is the sum of the proportional interactions with each alter (   ) weighted by the 
marginal strength of each alter’s strongest relationship with any other contact of actor i 
(   ).  Borgatti (1997) notes that Burt’s redundancy measure is just the average degree 
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of the actor’s alters (excluding ties to the actor), and it is the same as ego network 
density, scaled by a factor of n-1. He simplifies redundancy as the sum of ties excluding 
ties to the ego, multiplied by 2 and then divided by the sum of nodes excluding the ego. 
3.4.4.2 Effective Ego Network Size 
In Equation 3.13 (Burt, 1992), it is equivalent to the number of immediate 
neighbors a mayor has minus the average number of redundant ties. 
Effective Size (i) = ∑ [   ∑ (      ) ]                   q ≠ i  j (3.13) 
3.4.4.3 Efficiency 
In Equation 3.14, efficiency of the mayor’s ego network is computed as the ratio 
of the effective size of the ego network to the gross number of the ego’s contacts (N).  
Efficiency (i) = 
 
 
∑ [   ∑ (      ) ]                   q ≠ i  j (3.14) 
3.4.4.4 Constraint 
This study uses the formula for measuring ego network constraint without the 
assumption of absent primary holes (Burt,1992).  Defining proportional strength of 
relationship as the measure of time and energy invested by mayor on a relation with 
another mayor, Burt measures this concept as the proportional number of ties to that other 
mayor. In the equation, the specific constraint exerted by mayor j on mayor i is the 
combination of the proportional strength of the direct ties between mayors i and j (   ), 
and the proportional strength of mayor i’s indirect ties to mayor j. The value for this latter 
term is equivalent to the summed products of the proportional number of ties between 
mayor i and every mayor q who is different from mayor j (   ) and the proportional 
number of ties between mayor j and every mayor q (   ). This measure can be interpreted 
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as a constraint on mayor i’s entrepreneurial opportunities resulting from his 
“investments” on relations that lead to mayor j. At the same time, it can also be seen as 
mayor i’s intentional or unknowing dependence on mayor j for navigating opportunities 
in the ego network. Equation 3.16 indicates that the aggregate constraint on mayor i from 
within his ego network is the sum of     across contacts j. The values derived through this 
second formula were compared and used in the analyses. 
   =    + ∑ (      )    ,    i  ≠ q ≠ j (3.15) 
 ( ) = ∑     + ∑ (      )        ,     i  ≠ q ≠ j (3.16) 
3.4.4.5 Hierarchy 
As with Burt (1992, citing Coleman), this study applies the Cole-Theil disorder 
index  presented in Equation 4.17 to compute this network trait.  Hierarchy in mayor i’s 
ego network is equivalent to the sum of the ratio of the constraint from actor j (   ) to the 
average level of constraint per contact (C/N) multiplied by its natural logarithm, divided 
by the maximum possible sum. 
Hierarchy(i)  =  
∑ (
   
 
 ⁄
)   (
   
 
 ⁄
) 
    ( )
 
 
Where: 
C is the sum of constraints 
N is the total number of ties 
(3.16) 
 
3.4.5 Control and Other Variables 
Demographic and political characteristics of the mayor such as age, gender, 
education, experience in office, political party affiliation and experience in farming and 
organic farming, were considered in the preliminary analyses. Whether the mayor himself 
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was an organic technology user was used to control for access to experience-based 
knowledge deemed to affect the mayor’s receptiveness to organic technology and its 
promotion. Partisanship by way of a mayor’s affiliation with the most popular party 
among the respondents (LAKAS-CMD) was first considered as a control variable but was 
later dropped upon finding that it neither significantly improved the odds of policy 
attitude similarities nor narrowed down attitude gaps. 
3.4.6 Analysis 
Maps of the surveyed mayors’ relations were drawn in NetDraw (Borgatti, 2002). 
The networks maps were made up of ties based on reports of the most frequent 
interactions with other mayors in the province.  In two of the maps, Bonacich centrality 
and prestige scores for the respondents were also incorporated as node attributes. Red-
colored outlines were used to differentiate mayors who were nominated as objects of 
respect by the respondents.  Scores for network embeddedness traits were derived using 
the SNA tools in Ucinet (Borgatti, Everett & Freeman, 2002) and compared across the 
respondents.   
Typically, regular logistic regression is used to model log-odds of outcomes such 
as the ones being investigated in this study. The technique however uses the standard 
maximum-likelihood-based estimator, which depends on asymptotic results and performs 
poorly for small sample sizes (Cox & Snell,1989). Considering that only 24 cases are 
being considered here, exact logistic regression, a technique more suited to small sample 
sizes, was implemented instead. The method is based on permutational distributions of 
sufficient statistics and is useful in analyzing small binary data with covariates (Mehta & 
Patel, 1995).  Exact logistic regression estimates logistic model parameters referred to as 
118 
 
conditional maximum likelihood estimates (CMLEs). When the dependent variable is 
completely determined by the data, MLEs and the CMLEs become unbounded so a 
median unbiased estimate (MUE) is alternatively used (Hirji, Tsiatis, Mehta, 1989). In 
such a case, the exact logistic regression command in STATA13 (StataCorp., 2013) 
computes the MUE. 
Relationships between gaps in policy attitudes and mayors’ embeddedness and 
other traits were also first examined through simple correlation analysis. This was 
followed by ordinary least squares (OLS) estimations of the influences of embeddedness 
traits on policy attitude gaps between mayors and their peers. All these linear estimations 
were carried out first at the level of the entire network and later at the ego network level. 
3.5 Results 
Province-wide visits to municipalities in Bohol yielded a total of 24 participants 
in this study’s network and perception survey of mayors. From the distribution of 
respondents in Table 3.1, the majority (88 percent) of respondents were male.  About 58 
percent of the mayors were middle-aged (41-60 years) and on their first first-term in 
office. Almost all (96 percent) of the respondents had a minimum of a four-year college 
education, with about 38 percent coming from the medical and law professions. In terms 
of partisanship, half of the mayors belonged to the political party of the previous national 
government administration, LAKAS-CMD, which is a dominant component of the 
national opposition block.  
Figure 1 is a simple representation of the mayoral social network in Bohol, based 
on most frequent interactions reported by the 24 respondents who are represented by 
dark-colored nodes. The white-colored isolates represent mayors who neither participated 
119 
 
in the survey nor were identified by the respondents as one of the peers with whom most 
interactions are shared. Comparison of prominence scores was limited to the survey 
respondents. These values are summarized in Table 3.2. Found to be engaged in the most 
number of relations with other mayors, the mayor of Tubigon registered the highest 
degree centrality and closeness centrality (ARD).  These results indicate that the mayor of 
Tubigon not only had the most number of direct relations; he also depended least on 
intermediaries for information access and other transactions. Betweenness centrality 
scores show the mayor of Tubigon as positioned in the path of the most mayor-pairs, 
signifying that more direct ties can come with more opportunities for performing 
mediating roles in the network. On the other hand, the Bonacich centrality scores reveal a 
different ranking order. Table 2.2 and Figure 1 both show the mayors of Bilar and Alicia 
as the most central mayors in the network when the connectedness of mayors’ peers is 
considered. The differences in rankings shows the various ways positional advantages in 
the social network can be meaningfully assessed. It fits with this study’s approach of 
applying the different measures of mayoral embeddedness in investigating the influence 
of embeddedness on mayors’ policy attitude similarities.  
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TABLE 3.1: Distribution of respondents by individual characteristics. (n=24) 
          
   Characteristics   N % 
 
      Gender 
    
 
Male 
 
21 88 
 
 
Female 
 
3 13 
 
      Age 
    
 
40 and under 
 
3 13 
 
 
41-50 
 
6 25 
 
 
51-60 
 
8 33 
 
 
61-70 
 
5 21 
 
 
Above 70 
 
2 8 
 
      Experience as mayor 
    
 
First term (1-3 years) 
 
14 58 
 
 
Second term (4-6 years) 
 
5 21 
 
 
Third-fourth term (7-12 years) 
 
4 17 
 
 
More than four terms (Above 12 years) 
 
1 4 
 
      Education Level 
    
 
Trade School  
 
1 4 
 
 
College Degree 
 
14 58 
 
 
Advanced Degree  
 
9 38 
 
      Political Party Affiliation 
    
 
Lakas–Christian Muslim Democrats 
 
12 50 
 
 
Nacionalista Party 
 
8 33 
 
 
Laban ng Demokratikong Pilipino 
 
1 4 
 
 
Liberal Party 
 
1 4 
 
 
Partido Demokratiko Pilipino-Lakas ng Bayan 1 4 
 
 
Independent 
 
1 4 
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TABLE  3.2: Prominence measures based on undirected and directed ties. 
Directed Ties
Municipality
Degree 
Centrality
Closeness 
Centrality 
(ARD)
Betweenness 
Centrality
Bonacich 
Centrality Column1Prestige*
Alburquerque 0.065 0.304 0.040 0.004
Alicia 0.109 0.347 0.060 3.269 0.022
Anda 0.087 0.329 0.050 1.264
Antequera 0.065 0.289 0.029 0.145
Baclayon 0.065 0.270 0.069 0.177
Batuan 0.065 0.320 0.028 1.822
Bien Unido 0.022
Bilar 0.087 0.327 0.011 3.269
Buenavista 0.065 0.224 0.035 0.014
Calape 0.065 0.309 0.021 0.673
Catigbian 0.109 0.350 0.121 0.374 0.043
Corella 0.065 0.329 0.050 0.376
Dagohoy 0.065 0.320 0.070 0.465
Danao 0.022
Duero 0.130 0.377 0.081 2.266
Garcia 0.065 0.296 0.014 2.463
Jagna 0.065 0.289 0.042 1.459
Loay 0.022
Loon 0.043 0.255 0.002 0.302 0.022
Mabini 0.109 0.333 0.076 0.561 0.022
Maribojoc 0.087
Sagbayan 0.130 0.392 0.140 1.822
San Isidro 0.065 0.285 0.072 0.018
San Miguel 0.109 0.361 0.099 1.024 0.022
Sevilla 0.065 0.298 0.013 0.821
Talibon 0.087 0.312 0.046 0.465
Trinidad 0.065
Tubigon 0.152 0.407 0.215 0.818 0.043
Ubay 0.087 0.285 0.042 0.218 0.022
*Based on whether mayor was named as object of respect or admiration
 with regard to policymaking and leadership style. Includes mayors not 
in the survey (n=12).
Undirected ties
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In terms of prestige scores that are also reported in Table 3.2 and illustrated in 
Figure 3.2 as node size attributes, the mayor of Tubigon was reported by fellow 
respondents as the most respected, although it was the mayor of Maribojoc, a non-
respondent, who was identified as top recipient of this positive regard in the entire 
survey. A few other mayors who were not part of the survey were likewise identified and 
included in the reporting of prestige scores. Given very little variation in the prestige 
scores, use of a binary variable to signify a status of prestige, i.e., whether or not a mayor 
was named by any of the respondents as an object of respect or admiration, became a 
more meaningful representation of this type of prominence in the network. This form of 
the variable was used in the estimations. 
 Table 3.3 summarizes the structural hole traits of the respondents’ ego networks. 
About one-third of the ego networks formed a center-periphery structure in which the 
other contacts pass through the ego (see Figures 3.A and 3.D). These ego networks were 
all composed of non-redundant ties and exhibited optimum efficiency. In this type of 
network structure, mayors are at the intersection of communication exchange, indicating 
a position of learning advantage. Although larger network size seemed to generally 
coincide with higher redundancy, it is the greater extent of structural holes in the 
structures of some of the relatively larger networks (Figures 3.B and 3.L) that 
corresponds to higher network efficiency. With the exception of the network triads of 
non-redundant ties (Figure 3.D), the greater extent of structural holes in the ego networks 
were also compatible with lower network constraints. None of the hierarchy scores were 
remarkably extreme to indicate either equal distribution of constraint on all ties or full  
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TABLE 3.3: Structural hole measures for ego networks of surveyed mayors (n=24) 
Ego Network
No. of 
Alters Redundancy Effective Size Efficiency Constraint Hierarchy Shape
Loon 2 0.000 2.000 1.000 0.556 0.278 D
Buenavista 2 0.000 2.000 1.000 0.556 0.278 D
Alburquerque 3 0.000 3.000 1.000 0.333 0.000 A
Antequera 3 0.000 3.000 1.000 0.333 0.000 A
Baclayon 3 0.000 3.000 1.000 0.333 0.000 A
Batuan 3 0.000 3.000 1.000 0.333 0.000 A
Corella 3 0.000 3.000 1.000 0.333 0.000 A
Dagohoy 3 0.000 3.000 1.000 0.333 0.000 A
Jagna 3 0.000 3.000 1.000 0.333 0.000 A
San Isidro 3 0.000 3.000 1.000 0.333 0.000 A
Calape 3 0.667 2.333 0.778 0.611 0.052 C
Garcia 3 0.667 2.333 0.778 0.611 0.052 C
Sevilla 3 0.667 2.333 0.778 0.611 0.052 C
Anda 4 0.500 3.500 0.875 0.406 0.055 B
Ubay 4 0.500 3.500 0.875 0.406 0.055 B
Talibon 4 0.500 3.500 0.875 0.406 0.055 B
Bilar 4 0.857 3.143 0.786 0.571 0.125 F
San Miguel 5 0.750 4.250 0.850 0.387 0.146 K
Catigbian 5 0.800 4.200 0.840 0.382 0.091 G
Mabini 5 0.800 4.200 0.840 0.400 0.023 I
Alicia 5 1.417 3.583 0.717 0.560 0.152 E
Sagbayan 6 1.125 4.875 0.813 0.388 0.072 J
Duero 6 1.214 4.786 0.798 0.432 0.168 H
Tubigon 7 0.500 6.500 0.929 0.227 0.088 L
. 
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Figure 3.3: Types of ego network structures for surveyed mayors. 
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Figure 3.3 (continued). 
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concentration of constraint on just one relationship. The highest hierarchy score of 0.278 
was found for the same triads of nonredundant ties. 
Respondents’ views about organic farming and its promotion are summarized in 
Table 3.4. The mayors were generally receptive to the use and promotion of organic 
farming. Strong agreement was observed highest for statements pertaining to the 
environmental, health and income benefits of the technology. With regard to perceptions 
about the other benefits of organic farming, most of the respondents agreed to 
corresponding statements in the survey. From the distribution of scores across the five 
policy attitude categories (see Table 3.5), the majority of mayors concur with the 
perceived benefits of organic farming. Much of the divisions lie between mayors who 
agree and those who strongly agree with a type of benefit. 
As can be observed from Table 3.6, incidences of shared policy attitudes between 
mayors and their peers were more prevalent in the ego networks than in the entire 
network. While none of the mayors had the same level of attitude as their peers at the 
broad network level when it comes to the environmental and health benefits of organic 
farming, over half of the mayors did so with peers in their ego networks. In terms of 
economic and combined benefits of the technology and the political motivations for its 
promotion, the proportion of mayors who shared the same level of attitudes with other 
mayors in the ego network were consistently higher compared to those of mayors in the 
entire network. The same pattern holds for over-all receptiveness to the policy, with 
about 75 percent of the respondents sharing the same level of attitude with other mayors 
in their ego networks. Such is a snapshot of the extent and quality of information 
exchange at the time of the survey. The relatively low proportions of mayors who shared  
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TABLE 3.5: Distribution of respondents by level of agreement to perceived benefits of 
organic farming. 
Attitude Category
No. % No. % No. % No. % No. %
Environmental & health benefits 0 0 0 0 0 0 10 42 14 58
Economic benefits 2 8 2 8 0 0 16 67 4 17
Combined benefits 0 0 1 4 2 8 15 63 6 25
Political benefits of promotion 0 0 4 17 1 4 18 75 1 4
Over-all receptiveness 0 0 1 4 2 8 19 79 2 8
Strongly 
Disagree
Strongly 
Agree
AgreeUncertainDisagree
 
 
 
TABLE 3.6: Mayor-respondents with similar attitudes with their neighbors. 
No. % No. %
Environment and health benefits 0 0% 13 54%
Economic benefits 5 21% 12 50%
Combined benefits 14 58% 15 63%
Political motivations for promotion 8 33% 14 58%
Over-all receptiveness 7 29% 18 75%
Other mayors in the 
entire network
Other mayors in the 
local networkAttitudes Toward Organic Farming     
and its Promotion
Neighbor Group
 
 
the same attitudes with other mayors in the larger network level bares the early stage in 
the process of information exchange and attitude convergence pertaining to the new 
policy.  Since the smaller ego networks had shorter paths compared to the larger network, 
progress toward shared policy attitudes was visibly faster in the former.  
Exact logistic regression models of the incidence of policy attitude similarities at 
the broad network level are reported in Table 3.7. Estimations at this level excluded 
perceptions about environmental and health benefits of organic farming because not a 
single incidence of attitude similarity was found for all the 24 mayors. Of the models, 
131 
 
significant relationships were found only for those pertaining to similarities in 
perceptions about the combined benefits of organic farming and the political benefits of  
the technology’s promotion. The estimates failed to provide support for the hypotheses 
about the influences of centrality, prestige and ego-network structural hole traits on the 
incidence of attitude similarity between the mayor and his peers in the entire network. 
However, the analyses also produced a couple of unexpected yet very interesting 
findings.  
One finding is the contrarily predicted negative influence of a mayor having a 
high Bonacich centrality on the incidence of attitude similarity with network peers 
regarding the combined environmental, health and income benefits of organic farming. 
The coefficient for this variable was computed as a MUE instead of CMLE since it 
completely determined the dependent variable. In contrast to the first hypothesis, the 
expected log-odds of attitude similarity was found to significantly decline by 2.43 for 
mayors who have relatively more well-connected ties in the network.  Such result 
suggests that being more embedded in the network increases dissonance instead of 
convergence in knowledge and attitudes. Such a pattern is counterintuitive because 
greater centrality is expected to provide more opportunities for information exchange, 
policy learning, and eventually, convergence.  
Another finding is the negative effect of the practice of organic farming on the 
odds of a mayor becoming similar in policy attitudes to other mayors in the network. This 
variable was used to control for experience-based knowledge that can guide the mayor’s 
attitude toward organic farming and its promotion as a local policy.  As a control variable 
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for models involving ego network efficiency and constraint measures, it also significantly 
reduced the odds of attitude similarity on political benefits of technology promotion.  
In Table 3.8, the exact logistic estimates for the ego networks confirm the 
hypothesized influence of one of the embeddedness traits on the incidence of policy 
attitude similarities between mayors and their network peers. Results indicate that when it 
comes to perception of organic technology’s economic benefits to the farmer, every unit 
increase in a mayor’s betweenness centrality increases the expected log-odds of attitude 
similarity with fellow mayors in the ego network by 0.03. The effect of this variable, 
though small, provides support for the initial hypothesis in the study, at least in the 
context of local networks. It speaks to the mediating role of the mayor in information 
exchange that culminates into localized convergence in policy attitudes.   
Exact logistic regressions at the ego network level also showed the negative 
influence of Bonacich centrality on the expected log-odds of a mayor agreeing with their 
immediate neighbors about the political benefits of organic farming promotion. With 
comparisons now limited to direct ties of the mayor, this negative effect of Bonacich 
centrality on attitude similarity cannot be simply attributed to increased dissonance 
arising from exposure to more centrally positioned contacts. Rather, such direction of 
influence begs the question of what could associate this measure of centrality with a 
mayor’s tendency to significantly differ from his immediate peers with regard to this 
particular policy attitude. This issue is further discussed in the following section. 
Models in Table 3.8 where the practice of organic farming was found to significantly 
influence the incidence of similarity pertain to perceived political benefits of the organic 
farming’s promotion. Given that this variable’s influence is negative, it would seem that 
136 
 
the practice of organic farming creates an initial disparity in perceptions about the 
political benefits of its promotion. The smaller size of ego networks and the shorter paths 
between neighbors apparently do not ensure an information exchange process that could 
bring about some convergence in policy attitudes between mayors who have first-hand 
knowledge of the technology and their immediate peers. The existence of a 
communication mechanism in the direct ties within mayors’ ego networks should have 
improved the odds of attitude similarity but since the results showed the contrary, what 
remains is the task of elucidating why this could be so. I will explore these reasons in the 
following section. 
The influence of network embeddedness traits on the incidence of policy attitude 
similarities can also be understood in terms of the absolute gaps in perception or attitude 
scores. The means of these gaps as well as their correlations with embeddedness and 
other characteristics of the mayor are reported in Table 3.9. The gaps show that most of 
the respondents were different from their peers in two attitude categories: 1) perceived 
economic benefits of organic farming, and; 2) the political motivations for its promotion. 
At both the network and ego network levels, Bonacich centrality had modest to moderate 
positive associations with attitude gaps for combined technology benefits, political 
benefits of promotion and over-all receptiveness to organic farming, at both the network 
and ego network levels. With regard to perceptions about the environmental and health, 
economic and political benefits of organic farming promotion, increased betweenness 
centrality was found to be modestly associated with narrower gaps.  Increases in degree 
centrality were found to also modestly correlate with smaller attitude gaps, but only at the 
ego network level. On the other hand, prestige status was not significantly correlated with  
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the attitude gaps between mayors. Ego network hierarchy had a modest negative 
correlation with network-level perception gaps regarding the combined benefits of 
organic farming. With regard to perceived economic benefits of organic farming, a larger 
effective ego network size was associated with narrower gaps while higher ego network 
efficiency was modestly correlated to the widening of that gap. 
The practice of organic farming was found to be associated with increases in all 
attitude gaps except for perceived environmental and health benefits of organic farming, 
both at the network and ego network levels. These results are consistent with the pattern 
of relationship noted in the exact logistic estimations.  It is also notable from the 
correlations that the older mayors tend be moderately associated to having more years in 
service, owning a farm and the practice of organic farming. A moderate positive 
relationship between the mayor’s years in office and Bonacich centrality suggests how 
the length of tenure can improve not only the number but also the quality of a public 
official’s connections. The results of correlations also point to some moderate difference 
in social capital associated with the mayor’s age as older mayors were found to exhibit 
higher ego network efficiency, less constraint from local ties, and less concentration of 
influence from any of those local ties.  
The OLS estimates confirm the influence of Bonacich centrality and the practice 
of organic farming on the policy attitude differences between mayors and fellow mayors. 
None of the other embeddedness measures hypothesized to influence the incidence of 
attitude similarities were found to significantly influence mayors’ attitude gaps either. In 
the network level models (Table 3.10), estimates indicate that an increase in Bonacich 
centrality widens the perception gaps about the income benefits of organic farming, the  
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political benefits of its promotion, and the over-all receptiveness to the prospective 
policy. Such growth in attitude disparities arising from a higher extent of a mayor’s direct 
and indirect relations contradicts the expectation that increased embeddedness would 
draw one’s attitude closer to the mean attitude of the entire group.  Another major finding 
from the estimations is the positive influence of the practice of organic farming the 
network level gaps for all but one attitude categories. In Table 3.11, the model for the 
gaps in perceived combined benefits of organic farming reflects the same relationships at 
the ego network level. All these findings are consistent with the results of the exact 
logistic regression since widened attitude gaps reduce the odds of attitude similarities. 
3.6 Discussion and Conclusion 
The rankings of centrality scores, which the mayor of Tubigon consistently 
topped, revealed that having more direct ties coincides with less dependence on 
intermediaries to reach other mayors as well as lying on the most number of paths 
between other mayors. Incidentally, these measures of centrality---degree, closeness and 
betweenness--- were found to positively correlate with a mayor’s prestige status. In terms 
of Bonacich centrality, the mayors of Bilar and Alicia were tied at having the most well-
connected relations. Delineating the concept of prominence into these separate measures 
was demonstrably useful in evaluating positional advantages among mayors in the social 
network. As analyses later showed, it also aided meaningful assessment how visibility in 
the network influences attitude similarities between mayors. 
The regression analyses established support for the role of embeddedness in the 
convergence of mayors’ policy attitudes through the positive influence of betweenness 
centrality on the odds of a mayor agreeing with ego network peers regarding the 
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economic benefits of organic farming. Other centrality measures were not found to 
significantly improve consensus in any of the policy attitude categories. The influence of 
a mayor’s embeddedness on convergence of policy attitudes is hence singularly 
determined here by how much the local official is strategically positioned between fellow 
mayors within the ego network. A higher betweenness centrality renders the central 
mayor as an influential actor in the local network, be it as a source, consumer or 
intermediary of information exchange relevant to a prospective policy. Through any of 
these roles, the more central mayor is endowed with more opportunities to engage in and 
facilitate consensus-building information exchange with other mayors in the network.  
While the results do not provide support for the influence of the other centrality 
measures on policy attitude similarities, one unanticipated finding from the analyses 
warrants further discussion. The exact logistic estimations revealed that high Bonacich 
centrality reduces the odds of a mayor agreeing with peers in the broader network level 
about the combined benefits of organic farming. The OLS estimations also showed that 
increases in Bonacich centrality widen attitude gaps about the technology and its 
promotion. These results are contradictory to the earlier presented expectations of 
centrality’s general effect on relative policy attitudes of mayors. Being connected to well-
connected peers in the network provides an individual with more opportunities to be 
exposed to interpersonal influences, which in turn integrate conflicting opinions toward a 
consensus (Friedkin & Johnsen, 1999). How could greater exposure to information 
exchange not only fail to make a mayor imbibe the mean attitudes of other mayors in the 
network but also cause their attitudes to be significantly dissimilar from those? I propose 
here that this resulting disparity in policy attitudes cannot be simply attributed to the 
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extent of a mayor’s positional advantage in the network. Rather, a mayor’s Bonacich 
centrality may just be coinciding with an unquantifiable human quality that actually 
explains the attitude disparity with the rest of the network. Mayors who have well-
connected ties apparently possess skills that enable them to make those strategic relations 
in the network. This same set of skills, which can be described as a kind of “strategizing 
know-how,” is shaped by one’s years of experience in office as well as aptitude. 
Recalling that the majority of respondents possessed comparable academic credentials, 
aptitude here must refer to a decision-making ability that transcends educational 
background. Strategizing know-how must therefore account for the significant disparities 
in policy attitudes displayed by the more central mayors. Furthermore, such skill can also 
manifest in how these local officials withhold personal reservations for political reasons. 
The OAA is generally perceived as a “pet project” of the central government, a policy 
associated with the environmental advocacies of the incumbent agriculture secretary. The 
“socially savvy” mayor who also happens to hold conservative views about the 
prospective policy would be inclined to keep his knowledge and negative opinions about 
the technology to himself to maintain a harmonious relationship with officials in the 
higher government tiers. 
Another interesting result from the analyses is negative influence of practicing 
organic farming on the odds of a mayor sharing the attitude of his network peers about 
the benefits of the technology and its promotion.  Reported practice of the technology 
was also found to widen policy attitude gaps. I propose a few conjectures to explain this 
pattern of influence. First, these findings suggest that first-hand experience of the 
technology may generate for a mayor a different set of knowledge and perceptions about 
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organic farming than what the rest of the network knows on average. Secondly, mayors 
must value experience-based understanding of organic farming over other information 
available to them. Finally, mayors who possess experience-based information about 
organic farming may not be actively engaged in the discourse about the technology such 
that their biases, along with those of other mayors, are perpetuated and manifested in the 
observed policy attitude disparities. Given that significant disparities in attitudes were 
found even at the level of ego networks, it seems that the communication exchange that 
would have bridged differences in knowledge and eventually, policy attitudes, either did 
not materialize or proved ineffective, even with the existence of a communication 
network structure. Therefore, socially influencing the policy attitudes of mayors not only 
necessitates the existence of social structures deemed to channel communication 
exchange but also depends on the content and engagement of key actors in the relevant 
discourse supposedly being channeled by the social network. 
The analyses failed to substantiate the influences of the other embeddedness traits 
on the similarities in mayors’ attitudes about organic farming and the prospective policy 
of promoting the technology. Although prestige status was expected to lead to emulation, 
mayors who were identified as objects of their colleagues’ attention and deference did not 
exhibit similar policy attitudes with mayors in their immediate and broader networks. The 
regression estimations also did not provide support for the effect of tie strength on policy 
attitude similarities between mayors and their network peers. Apparently, structural holes 
within each mayor’s ego network did not materialize into sufficient exposure to social 
influence and information from the broader network, at least not to the extent of bringing 
about policy attitude similarities. In addition, the results suggest that although redundant 
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ties and constraints are looked upon to promote cohesion within the ego network, these 
traits do not necessarily ensure similarities in policy attitudes between mayors and their 
immediate neighbors. 
To put additional perspective to the attitude gaps in these analyses, I revisited the 
receptiveness scores on which the gaps were based.  Intriguingly, the same two variables 
that were found to significantly widen attitude gaps--- Bonacich centrality and the 
practice of organic farming--- were also negatively correlated to the receptiveness scores. 
Results of the correlations for Bonacich centrality indicate that mayors who have well-
connected ties not only tend to think differently about organic farming than the other 
mayors; they also have more conservative attitudes about the technology. Such 
pragmatism can be interpreted as attitude manifesting mayors’ strategizing know-how. 
With regard to the somewhat sobering influence of experience with organic farming on 
mayors’ receptiveness to the technology,  such pattern echoes cases in the Philippines and 
India where early adopters gave accounts of the technology’s productivity setbacks 
(Mendoza, 2004; Sharma, et al,  2008; Panneerselvam, Hermansen & Halberg, 2010). 
Mayors who wear the same hat of technology adopters would understandably be less 
optimistic than their peers about perceived benefits of organic farming because they are 
privy to these less than ideal immediate outcomes of organic farming.  
3.7 Implications for Policy and Practice 
As originally intended, this study speaks to the relevance of social networks in the 
process of policy learning for Philippine municipal governments. Findings point to the 
potential of tapping into mayors’ social networks for the diffusion of new local policy 
initiatives as well as regional and national policy agenda since higher betweenness 
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centralities for mayors were found to enhance the pace of information dissemination in 
the network. Given that betweenness centrality was found to significantly improve the 
odds of attitude similarity between mayors and their immediate peers, this embeddedness 
measure can be used as basis for identifying crucial actors for area-wide dissemination of 
policy information. The finding also highlights the value of identifying and thereby 
encouraging ties that bring key governance actors to positions of access to information 
exchange with other officials.  
Fortunately, there are institutions in the country such as the League of 
Municipalities of the Philippines (LMP), the Department of Interior and Local 
Government (DILG), provincial governments and non-government organizations (NGOs) 
that can foster the development and strengthening of strategic ties between local officials. 
For instance, Boholano mayors are organized into a provincial league that holds monthly 
meetings in the provincial capital. Annually, the LMP organizes conferences for each of 
the three island clusters of municipalities in the country. Such assemblies promote 
camaraderie while also serving as venues for policy dialogues. Both are useful policy 
learning tools that can guide the governance choices of the local officials. 
While it is easy to surmise that this study ‘s ultimate policy goal is widespread 
adoption of organic farming technology, the intention of this inquiry is not necessarily the 
attainment of such results. Instead, its definitive focus is the attainment of local policy 
convergence through similarities in policy perceptions among local officials. Such a goal 
may be applicable to various contexts of policy innovations although this particular 
inquiry is directed at the prospect of organic technology promotion of the local 
government.  
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The disparities in policy receptiveness—between mayors who have used the 
technology to be promoted by the prospective policy and those who don’t—illustrate the 
gaps in information that arise from unshared first-hand learning. Creation of opportunities 
for direct information exchange like policy-specific fora and consultations can help 
bridge such knowledge gaps. Furthermore, the negative influence of the practice of 
organic farming on policy attitude similarity (within ego-networks) suggests that the 
existence of direct mayoral interactions does not guarantee a communication mechanism 
relevant to the building of consensus for the prospective policy. For this reason, targeted 
discourses through which mayors can have access to the exchange of experiential 
knowledge and peer feedback are crucial. The value of policy-specific consultations for 
this prospective policy, as well as for others that come along, cannot be overstated. 
With regard to the observation of lower receptiveness to organic farming among 
mayors who use the technology, the implications pertain to how the experience of “early 
adopters” with productivity setbacks might be addressed.  As with any other type of 
agricultural innovation, continued and rigorous agronomic research can help clarify the 
general public understanding about the impacts of organic technology. The scientific 
community would need the political and fiscal support of the public sector—local and 
nationa—in order to pursue such objective.  Incidentally, the OAA declares the national 
government’s commitment to this end.  Moreover, continued commitment of national 
agencies, the academe and local governments to a coordinated sharing of the latest 
innovations and field reports can help ensure the accurate assessment and attainment of 
the technology’s target outcomes. Institutional support from the national government is 
crucial in building and strengthening these partnerships. 
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Early adopters’ concern about low productivity in organic farming is closely tied 
to its impact on farm incomes. Where there are specialized markets for organically grown 
produce, low productivity can be offset by price premiums (Nemes, 2009). Conversely, 
the lack of access to niche markets as well as established certification systems makes low 
farm productivity difficult to economically justify, even with lower input costs of the 
technology. Considering that these crucial institutions are still currently being developed 
around the country, many early adopters have yet to take access the compensatory price 
adjustments in organic produce markets. To this end, the setting up of certification 
systems around the country as well as the creation of links to specialized markets for 
organic produce must be expedited. 
While the discussion of productivity setbacks is so far depicted here as a direct 
impact of the technology, it can also be argued that results experienced by early adopting 
mayors may be brought about by environmental spillovers which could similarly 
influence perceived health and environmental impacts of organic technology. When 
organic farming is practiced partially and unsystematically in an area, the adopting farms 
are not immune from seepage of chemicals and migration of pests from adjacent 
conventional farms. Lows productivity can hence arise. This implies that the effect of 
organic technology is contingent on the scope and scheme of its adoption. Elevating the 
promotion of organic technology from individual toward community and regional levels 
of adoption can help mitigate the effects of spillovers that contaminate the technology’s 
impact. In this way, convergence patterns in attitudes and eventual actions of local 
officials with regard to the prospective policy impacts the realization of the technology’s 
ultimate productivity, economic and environmental outcomes for farmers and local 
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communities who are ultimately affected by the wide use (or non-use) of organic 
technology in farming. 
3.8 Caveats and Future Work 
On account of small sample size, this study suffers from generalizability issues. 
However, it is exploratory in its approach to the understanding socially embedded policy 
learning and hence focuses on lessons that inform the understanding of the mechanisms 
of socially mediated policy learning.  Extension of this research to include a larger 
representative sample size is the instinctive next step. 
This study used single-period network and attitude survey data that were collected 
at the heels of the OAA’s promulgation. It presents a “snapshot” of mayoral networks in 
Bohol along with the policy attitude patterns of these LGU officials at a relatively early 
stage of the corresponding local policy’s dissemination.  While the findings here are an 
informative guide to understanding the early patterns of attitude similarities in mayoral 
networks, shifts in mayoral relations and continuing information exchanges over time 
result into a dynamic relationship between embeddedness and the relative policy attitudes 
of mayors. Expansion of research toward a longitudinal focus is aptly the subject of a 
follow-up work.  
The timing of the research also limited this investigation to the influence of 
network embeddedness on policy attitude similarities for mayors rather than patterns of 
policy convergence for municipalities. Since latter is best captured in the more advanced 
phases of the policy’s diffusion process, a later study will look into this variable in 
relation to mayoral embeddedness. As there are other actors that play crucial roles in 
local policy making and governance, this inquiry can also be expanded to explore the 
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social organization of other local policy actors, such as other elected local government 
officials, bureaucrats, and community group leaders. Embeddedness traits of these actors 
can likewise be explored in relation to policy learning processes and outcomes.  
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APPENDIX E: SAMPLE LBP FORM NO. 3 
 
OFFICE/SPECIAL PURPOSE APPROPRIATIONS: MUNICIPAL AGRICULTURAL OFFICER
Past Year Current Year Budget Year
Object of Expenditure Acct 2010 2011 2012
Code (Actual) (Estimate) (Proposed)
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
1.0 Current Operating Expenditures
     1.1  Personal Services
            Salaries and Wages-Regular 701 379,008.00     650,544.00            568,740.00             
            PERA 711 72,000.00       54,000.00              72,000.00               
            Clothing/Uniform Allowance 715 12,000.00       12,000.00              12,000.00               
            Productivity Incentive Allow. 717 6,000.00         6,000.00                6,000.00                 
               Other Bonuses and Allowances 719 9,000.00         9,000.00                9,000.00                 
            Cash Gift 724 15,000.00       15,000.00              15,000.00               
            Year End Bonus 725 31,584.00       54,212.00              47,395.00               
                Life and Ret. Ins. Contributions 731 45,482.58       78,065.28              68,248.80               
            PAG-IBIG Contributions 732 3,600.00         3,600.00                3,600.00                 
            PHILHEALTH Contributions 733 4,500.00         4,950.00                6,900.00                 
            ECC Contributions 734 3,600.00         3,600.00                3,600.00                 
            Other Personnel Benefits 749 105,000.00     
            Total Personal Services 686,774.58     890,971.28            812,483.80             
     1.2  Maintenance and Other
           Operating Expenses
            Traveling Expenses-Local 751 40,000.00       60,000.00              50,000.00               
                Office Supplies Expenses 755 15,000.00       15,000.00              15,000.00               
                  Animal/Zoological Sup. Exp. 757 20,000.00              20,000.00               
            Other Supplies Expenses 765 10,000.00       10,000.00              10,000.00               
            Telephone Exp.-Mobile 773 5,885.00         6,000.00                6,000.00                 
            Representatiom Expenses 783 10,000.00               
            R/M-Office Equipment 821 5,000.00                 
            R/M-IT Equipment & Software 823 15,000.00              10,000.00               
            Other Maint. & Oprtg. Exp. 969 10,000.00              5,000.00                 
            Total  Maint. & Oprtg. Exp. 70,885.00       136,000.00            131,000.00             
2.0  Capital Outlay
            Office Eqpt-Aircon unit 221 28,872.00       
            Furniture and Fixtures 222 20,000.00              
            IT-Equipment & Software 223
            -Laptop 20,000.00               
            -monitor 15,000.00               
            -Television Set 8,290.00         
            -VCD Player 7,218.00         
            Communication Equipment 229 1,985.00         
             -Karaoke 
            Total Capital Outlay 46,365.00       20,000.00              35,000.00               
3.0  Financial Expenses
           20% Development Fund 462,000.00            200,000.00             
           Total Financial Expenses 462,000.00            200,000.00             
804,024.58     1,508,971.28         1,178,483.80          
Prepared: Reviewed:           Approved:
           MAO      Local Budget Officer            Local Chief Executive
PROGRAMMED APPROPRIATION AND OBLIGATION
BY OBJECT OF EXPENDITURE
Total Appropriations
